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PREFACE
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 emphasizes the need 
for standards to protect the health and safety of workers exposed to an 
ever-increasing number of potential hazards at their workplace. The 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has projected a 
formal system of research, with priorities determined on the basis of 
specified indices, to provide relevant data from which valid criteria for 
effective standards can be derived. Recommended standards for occupational 
exposure, which are the result of this work, are based on the health 
effects of exposure. The Secretary of Labor will weigh these recommen­
dations along with other considerations such as feasibility and means of 
implementation in developing regulatory standards.
It is intended to present successive reports as research and epide­
miologic studies are completed and as sampling and analytical methods are 
developed. Criteria and standards will be reviewed periodically to ensure 
continuing protection of the worker.
I am pleased to acknowledge the contributions to this report on 
phosgene by members of my staff and the valuable constructive comments by 
the Review Consultants on Phosgene, by the ad hoc committees of the 
American Academy of Occupational Medicine and the American Academy of 
Industrial Hygiene, and by Robert B. O'Connor, M.D., NIOSH consultant in 
occupational medicine. The Department of the Army, Edgewood Arsenal, 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and the Ministry of Defence, Chemical 
Defence Establishment, Porton, England, have been very helpful in
declassifying documents so they could be reviewed for use in this report. 
The NIOSH recommendations for standards are not necessarily a consensus of 
all the consultants and professional societies that reviewed this criteria 
document on phosgene. Lists of the NIOSH Review Committee members and of 
the Review Consultants appear on the following pages.
John F. Finklea, M.D.
Director, National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health
The Division of Criteria Documentation and Standards 
Development, National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, had primary responsibility for 
development of the criteria and recommended standard 
for phosgene. The University of Washington, School 
of Public Health and Community Medicine, developed 
the basic information for consideration by NIOSH 
staff and consultants under contract No. HSM-99-73- 
36. Jon R. May, Ph.D., had NIOSH program 
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I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PHOSGENE STANDARD
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
recommends that worker exposure to phosgene in the workplace be controlled 
by requiring compliance with the following sections. The standard is 
designed to protect the health and safety of workers for up to a 10-hour 
workday, 40-hour workweek over a working lifetime. Compliance with the 
standard should therefore prevent adverse effects of phosgene on the health 
and safety of workers. The standard is measurable by techniques that are 
valid, reproducible, and available to industry and government agencies. 
Sufficient technology exists to permit compliance with the recommended 
standard. The standard will be subject to review and revision as 
necessary.
"Phosgene" is defined as gaseous or liquified phosgene. Synonyms for 
phosgene include carbonyl chloride, carbon oxychloride, chlorofomyl 
chloride, and CG (designation used by military agencies). "Occupational 
exposure to phosgene" is defined as exposure above half the recommended 
time-weighted average (TWA) environmental limit. Exposure at lower 
concentrations will not require adherence to the following Sections except 
for Sections 3, 4(a), 4(b), 4(c)(3), 4(c)(5), 4(c)(6), 5, 6, 7, and 8(a). 
"Overexposure" is defined as known or suspected exposure above either the 
TWA or ceiling concentrations, or any exposure which leads to development 
of pulmonary symptoms.
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Section 1 - Environmental (Workplace Air)
(a) Concentration
Occupational exposure to phosgene shall be controlled so that no 
worker is exposed to phosgene at a concentration greater than one-tenth 
part phosgene per million parts of air (0.1 ppm) determined as a TWA 
concentration for up to a 10-hour workday, 40-hour workweek, or to more 
than two-tenths part phosgene per million parts of air (0.2 ppm) as a 
ceiling concentration for any 15-minute period.
(b) Sampling and Analysis
Procedures for sampling, calibration of equipment, and analysis of 
environmental samples shall be as provided in Appendices I and II, or by 
any method shown to be equivalent in precision, accuracy, and sensitivity 
to the methods specified.
Section 2 - Medical
(a) Comprehensive preplacement and annual medical examinations 
shall be made available to all workers to be occupationally exposed to 
phosgene unless a different frequency is indicated by professional medical 
judgment based on such factors as emergencies, variations in work periods, 
and preexisting health status of individual workers.
(b) These examinations shall include, but shall not be limited to:
(1) Comprehensive or interim medical and work histories.
(2) A comprehensive medical examination giving particular 
attention to pulmonary function. Preplacement and follow-up pulmonary 
function tests shall be performed and shall include the forced vital
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capacity (FVC), the one-second forced expiratory volume (FEV 1), and the 
forced midexpiratory flow (FEF 25-75); a preplacement chest X-ray shall be 
obtained. The possibility of increased risk for workers with preexisting 
cardiovascular or pulmonary diseases should be considered and, when 
appropriate, the workers should be given counseling on the possibility of 
increased risk. Return to work after an absence for sickness due to 
phosgene overexposure shall require medical approval.
(3) A judgment of the worker's ability to use a negative or 
positive pressure respirator.
(c) Proper medical management shall be provided for workers 
overexposed to phosgene.
In case of known or suspected overexposure to phosgene, first aid 
measures shall be taken immediately, followed by prompt medical evaluation 
and care. Overexposed persons should not be permitted any unnecessary 
physical exertion. They should be carried to a vehicle for subsequent 
transportation to receive medical assistance. Pressurized oxygen and 
attendants trained in its use shall be available in the event they are 
needed for persons in respiratory distress. In case of skin or eye contact 
with liquid phosgene, contaminated clothing shall be removed immediately 
and the exposed body areas flushed with copious amounts of water. The 
plant physician or medical consultant shall be informed of any suspected 
overexposure to phosgene and shall determine the need for X-ray or 
pulmonary function studies or hospitalization. Because of the often- 
delayed onset of symptoms following overexposure to phosgene, surveillance 
or monitoring of the patient by a physician or by trained paramedical 
personnel is required for the 24-hour period following overexposure. A
posterior-anterior chest film should be taken in each instance of known or 
suspected overexposure to phosgene for comparison with preplacement chest 
films. Pulmonary function tests may be useful during convalescence.
(d) Medical records shall be maintained for all workers 
occupationally exposed to phosgene. All pertinent medical records with 
supporting documents, including chest films for at least the 5 years 
preceding termination of employment and the original preplacement chest 
films, shall be maintained for at least 5 years after the termination of 
the individual’s employment. The designated medical representatives of the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, of the Secretary of Labor, of 
the employer, and of the employee or former employee shall have access to 
these medical records.
Section 3 - Labeling (Posting)
All containers of phosgene and all areas where phosgene is stored, 
handled, used, or formed shall be labeled and placarded in accordance with 
An Identification System for Occupationally Hazardous Materials, a 
recommended standard published by NIOSH, and in accordance with the 
following subsections.
(a) Containers of phosgene shall bear the following label in 





Harmful or fatal if inhaled, may cause delayed lung injury.
Do not breathe gas.
Do not get liquid in eyes, on skin, or on clothing.
Use only with adequate ventilation and/or in closed systems.
Open containers with care.
Have respiratory protection available for emergency.
FIRST AID CALL A PHYSICIAN IMMEDIATELY
In case of inhalation, remove victim to uncontaminated 
atmosphere.
If breathing stops, administer artificial respiration.
Do not allow victim to walk or exercise.
In case of liquid contact, immediately flush skin or eyes 
with water.
Remove contaminated clothing without delay and dispose of 
liquid properly.
(b) The following warning sign shall be affixed in a readily 
visible location at or near entrances to areas in which phosgene is stored, 
handled, used, or formed:
CONTAINS PHOSGENE
EXTREME HEALTH HAZARD
Harmful or fatal if inhaled, may cause delayed lung injury.
In emergency, enter only if wearing respiratory, eye, and 
skin protection.
Phosgene respiratory protection located at (specific locations 
to be supplied by employer).
Unauthorized persons keep out.
This sign shall be printed both in English and in the predominant 
language of non-English-speaking workers, if any. All employees shall be 
trained and informed of the hazardous area with special instruction given 
to illiterate workers.
(c) All systems, piping, and associated equipment containing
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phosgene shall be plainly marked for positive identification in accordance 
with American National Standard A13.1-1956. Shut-off valves shall be 
conspicuously labeled. Phosgene containers in use shall be plainly marked 
"In Use" to distinguish them from those not in use.
Section 4 - Personal Protective Equipment and Clothing
Engineering controls shall be used to maintain phosgene 
concentrations below the prescribed limits. When necessary, this shall be 
supplemented by the use of personal protective equipment. Requirements for 
personal protective equipment shall be in accordance with provisions of 29 
CFR 1910 (Federal Register 39:23670, June 27, 1974).
(a) Skin Protection
(1) In addition to the respiratory protection specified in 
Table 1-1, personnel performing emergency operations involving exposure to 
liquid phosgene shall wear one-piece suits, impervious to phosgene and 
tight at the ankles, wrists, and around the neck and face. The suits shall 
be ventilated with supplied air, preferably cooled, or time in the work 
area shall be limited with due consideration to the heat stress factors 
involved. Impervious gloves and boots shall also be worn. Such protective 
clothing shall be available at a convenient location outside the 
contaminated area.
(2) The employer shall insure a sufficient supply and 
adequate maintenance of protective clothing.
(b) Eye Protection
Personnel handling liquid phosgene in situations where eye contact 
can occur shall have eye protection afforded by full-face respiratory
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protection as specified in Table 1-1, since concentrations of phosgene 
sufficient to cause eye damage are also likely to cause respiratory tract 
damage.
(c) Respiratory Protection
(1) Compliance with the exposure limits may be achieved by 
the use of respirators only:
(A) during the time period necessary to install and 
test the controls required by Section 6(b) of this chapter;
(B) for nonroutine operations such as a brief 
exposure in excess of the TWA or ceiling concentration exposure limit as a 
result of maintenance or repair activities; or
(C) in emergencies when air concentrations of 
phosgene may exceed the TWA exposure limit.
(2) When a respirator is permitted by paragraph (1) of this 
subsection, it shall be selected from among those jointly approved by the 
Bureau of Mines, US Department of the Interior, and by the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, US Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, under the provisions of 30 CFR 11. The employer 
shall provide the respirator required and shall ensure its use. A 
respiratory protection program meeting the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.134, 
as amended, shall be established and enforced by the employer. Only 




Air Concentrations Respirator Type*
Less than or equal to 
1 ppm
Less than or equal to 
2ppm
Greater than 2 ppm or 
emergency situations
(1) Any supplied-air respirator; or
(2) Any self-contained breathing 
apparatus.
(1) Any supplied-air respirator with 
a full facepiece, helmet, or hood; or
(2) Any self-contained breathing 
apparatus with a full facepiece.
(1) Self-contained breathing apparatus 
with a full facepiece operated in 
pressure-demand or other positive 
pressure mode; or
(2) A combination respirator which 
includes a Type C supplied-air 
respirator with a full facepiece 
operated in pressure-demand or 
other positive pressure or continuous 
flow mode and an auxiliary self- 
contained breathing apparatus 
operated in pressure-demand or other 
positive pressure mode.
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TABLE 1-1 (CONTINUED) 
RESPIRATOR SELECTION GUIDE
Air Concentrations Respirator Type*
Firefighting Self-contained breathing apparatus 
with a full facepiece operated in 
pressure-demand or other positive 
pressure mode.
Evacuation or escape (1) Any gas mask providing protection 
against phosgene; or
(2) Any escape self-contained breathing 
apparatus with full facepiece.
* Approved by the Bureau of Mines and the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health
(3) Each work area where there is potential for 
occupational exposure to phosgene shall have at least 2 sets of self- 
contained breathing apparatus readily available in nearby locations which 
do not require entry into, or passage through, a contaminated area for 
access.
(4) Respirators specified for use in higher concentrations 
of phosgene may be used in atmospheres of lower concentrations.
(5) Employees shall be trained and drilled in the use of
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respirators assigned to them and in testing for leakage.
(6) Canisters shall be discarded and replaced with fresh 
canisters after use. Unused canisters shall be discarded and replaced when 
the seal is broken or when the shelf life, as recommended by the 
manufacturer, is exceeded.
Section 5 - Informing Employees of Hazards from Phosgene
At the beginning of employment, workers who will work in areas 
required to be posted in accordance with Section 3(b) shall be informed of 
the hazards from phosgene, symptoms of overexposure, emergency procedures, 
and precautions to ensure safe use and to minimize exposure. First aid 
procedures shall be included. This information shall be posted in the work 
place and kept on file, readily accessible to the worker.
A continuing educational program shall be instituted for workers 
whose jobs may involve occupational exposure to phosgene. This is to 
ensure that all such workers have current knowledge of job hazards, 
maintenance procedures, and clean-up methods, and that they know how to use 
respiratory protective equipment and protective clothing. Workers should 
be advised that the detection of the odor of phosgene at any time indicates 
the need for immediate corrective procedures or withdrawal from the area. 
First-line supervisors shall be thoroughly informed of these hazards and 
procedures and should participate in the education of workers.
In addition, members of emergency teams and employees who work in 
areas adjacent to phosgene systems or containers, where a potential for 
emergencies exists, shall participate in periodic drills, simulating 
emergencies appropriate to the work situation. Drills shall be held at
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intervals not exceeding 6 months. Drills should cover, but should not be 
limited to:
Evacuation procedures.
Handling of spills and leaks, including decontamination. 
Location and use of emergency firefighting equipment, and 
handling of phosgene and chlorinated hydrocarbon systems 
and/or containers in case of fire.
First aid and rescue procedures, including prearranged 
procedures for obtaining emergency medical care.
Location, use, and care of protective clothing and 
respiratory protective equipment.
Location of shut-off valves or switches.
Location, purpose, and use of safety showers and eyewash 
fountains.
Operating procedures including communication procedures.
Entry procedures for confined spaces.
Deficiencies noted during drills shall be included in the continuing 
educational program, together with the required remedial actions. Records 
of drills and training conducted shall be kept for one year and made 
available for inspection by authorized personnel as required.
Information as required shall be recorded on the US Department of 
Labor Form OSHA-20, "Material Safety Data Sheet," shown in Appendix IV or 
on a similar form approved by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, US Department of Labor.
Section 6 - Work Practices
(a) Emergency Procedures
For all work areas in which there is a potential for emergencies, 
procedures specified below, as well as any other procedures appropriate for 
a specific operation or process, shall be formulated in advance and 
employees shall be instructed and drilled in their implementation.
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(1) Procedures shall Include prearranged plans for:
(A) immediate evacuation of overexposed workers;
(B) transportation of overexposed workers;
(C) any necessary calls for assistance, including 
alerting medical facilities of the impending arrival of overexposed 
workers, and calls to suppliers or manufacturers of phosgene for any 
necessary technical advice;
(D) designation of medical receiving facilities and
names of physicians trained in phosgene emergency procedures;
(E) reentry for maintenance or clean-up purposes of 
areas where phosgene leaks or spills have occurred.
(2) Approved eye, skin, and respiratory protection as 
specified in Section 4 shall be used by personnel essential to emergency 
operations.
(3) Nonessential employees shall be evacuated from
hazardous areas during emergencies. Perimeters of these areas shall be 
delineated, posted, and secured. The employees in adjacent areas shall be 
trained in evacuation procedures in the event that their work areas become 
involved.
(4) Personnel who cannot be evacuated shall keep upwind of
phosgene spills or leaks, if possible. Only personnel trained in the 
emergency procedures and protected against the attendant hazards shall shut 
off sources of phosgene, clean up spills, and control and repair leaks.
(5) In case of fire, phosgene containers shall be removed 
to a safe place, or cooled with water if leaks do not exist. Efforts shall 
be made to prevent phosgene cylinders from reaching temperatures above 50 C 
(122 F).
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(6) Water shall not be used on phosgene leaks because
accelerated corrosion of metal by phosgene in the presence of moisture will 
quickly make the leak worse.
(7) If possible, phosgene emissions shall be directed to an
alkali scrubber or to process (ie, routed by means of appropriate valving 
within a closed system to a secondary holding vessel or neutralization 
system).
(8) Containers leaking liquid phosgene should he positioned 
so that gaseous phosgene is discharged through the leak until control is 
effected.
(9) If local emergency teams cannot cope with the
emergency, assistance shall be requested from the supplier or the nearest 
phosgene-manufacturing facility. Telephone numbers of emergency help shall 
be prominently posted.
(10) Phosgene in contact with skin or eyes must be removed
by immediate flushing with copious quantities of water, and immediate
medical attention must be obtained. Contaminated clothing must be removed 
immediately. If the worker has inhaled phosgene, remove him to an 
uncontaminated atmosphere, give artificial respiration if required, and get 
immediate medical attention in accordance with Section 6(a)(1). Do not 
allow the victim to walk or exercise in any manner. Keep the victim quiet 
and warm.
(b) Control of Airborne Phosgene
Engineering controls shall be used to maintain phosgene
concentrations at or below the prescribed limits. The use of completely
enclosed processes is the preferred method of control for phosgene. Local
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exhaust ventilation may also be effective, used alone or in combination 
with process enclosure. Ventilation systems shall be designed to prevent 
the accumulation or recirculation of phosgene in the workroom, to maintain 
phosgene concentrations within the limits of the recommended standard, and 
to remove phosgene from the breathing zones of workmen. Exhaust
ventilation systems shall discharge to the outside air through a sorption 
or a decomposition system (eg, scrubbers containing an alkaline scrubbing 
medium, such as 5% sodium hydroxide solution). Ventilation systems shall 
be subject to regular preventive maintenance and cleaning to ensure 
effectiveness, which shall be verified by periodic air-flow measurements. 
Tempered makeup air shall be provided to workrooms in which exhaust 
ventilation is operating.
(c) Storage
(1) Phosgene shall be stored in unoccupied, adequately
ventilated, cool, and dry rooms, or outdoors shielded from the direct rays 
of the sun and protected from moisture.
(2) Phosgene storage rooms shall be provided with an
inspection window to permit viewing of the interior without entry.
(3) Phosgene storage areas shall be completely isolated
from work areas. If separated from a work area by a common wall, all 
holes, ducts, doors, and passthroughs which could allow phosgene to enter 
other parts of the plant shall be secured and sealed. Central cooling and 
heating ducts shall not extend to phosgene storage enclosures.
(4) Ventilation switches and emergency respiratory 
protection shall be located outside storage areas in readily accessible 
locations which will be free of phosgene in an emergency. Fan switches
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shall be equipped with indicator lights.
(5) Phosgene containers shall be secured to prevent 
falling, upsetting, or rolling, and shall be protected from mechanical 
damage, heat, moisture, and corrosion.
(6) Containers of phosgene should be used on a first-in, 
first-out (FIFO) basis. Storage of phosgene shall be limited to the 
minimum necessary for the operation.
(7) Used containers should not be stored with full 
containers. Full containers shall be so marked, and containers in use 
shall be plainly marked "In Use" to differentiate from those not in use.
(8) Other materials should not be stored with phosgene.
(9) Phosgene containers shall be frequently inspected for 
leaks and deterioration. If the hydrostatic test date stamped on cylinders 
is older than 5 years, the cylinder shall be returned to the vendor, or 
arrangements shall be made to have the necessary test performed.
(d) Handling and General Work Practices
(1) Written operating instructions and emergency medical 
procedures shall be formulated and posted where phosgene is handled or 
used.
(2) Prompt medical attention shall be obtained if there is 
known or suspected overexposure to phosgene, whether or not symptoms are 
present.
(3) Returnable phosgene containers shall not be washed out
with water.
(4) Safety valves and vents for phosgene equipment shall 
discharge through absorbers or neutralizers (decomposition system).
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(5) Phosgene containers and systems shall be inspected
daily for leaks. All phosgene equipment including valves, fittings, and 
connections shall be checked for tightness and good working order. All 
newly made connections shall be checked for leaks immediately after 
phosgene is admitted. Needed repairs and adjustments shall be made 
promptly.
(6) Appropriate precautions shall be taken to keep phosgene 
and phosgene equipment free of moisture. Piping, valves, and containers 
shall be capped or closed when not in use to keep atmospheric moisture out 
of the system.
(7) Transportation and use of phosgene shall comply with 
all applicable federal, state, and local regulations.
(8) When phosgene containers are being moved, or when they
are not in use and are disconnected, valve protection covers shall be in 
place. Containers shall be moved only with the proper equipment and shall 
be secured to prevent dropping or loss of control while moving. Slings or 
magnetic devices shall not be modified, altered, or repaired except as
normally intended by the supplier.
(9) Valves and pumps shall be readily accessible and should
not be located in pits and congested areas.
(10) Discharge rates of containers of phosgene may be
increased by use of warm air or warm water. Steam, boiling water, or 
direct flame shall not be used. Cylinder temperatures shall not exceed 50 
C (122 F). V
(11) Containers discharging liquid phosgene shall not be
connected to manifolds. Phosgene delivery tubes and pipes from other than
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high- pressure containers should not be immersed in other liquids without 
interposing a check valve or a trap to prevent back siphonage.
(12) The amount of phosgene used from a container shall be 
determined by a positive method (eg, weighing the preweighed container).
(13) New gaskets shall be used each time phosgene system 
connections are made.
(14) Welding or burning on tanks or equipment which have 
contained phosgene shall take place only after such tanks or equipment have 
been thoroughly purged with a dry inert gas, vented to a sorption or 
decomposition system. Steam or water shall not be introduced to the tanks, 
system, or equipment. Phosgene equipment, containers, or piping shall not 
be repaired while in service.
(15) Before phosgene is admitted to a system, the system 
shall be thoroughly cleaned, dried, and tested, using previously formulated 
procedures.
(16) Personnel shall not work alone when phosgene is first 
admitted to a system or while repairing leaks.
(17) Containers and systems shall be handled and opened with
care. Approved eye, skin, and respiratory protection shall be worn while
opening, connecting, and disconnecting phosgene containers and systems. 
When opening containers or systems, adequate ventilation shall be available 
to prevent inadvertent exposure to phosgene.
(18) Any odor of phosgene shall be reported to a responsible




(1) Where phosgene is stored, piped, handled, or used, 
eyewash fountains and safety showers shall be located immediately outside 
the area. They shall be readily accessible and shall be inspected
frequently and kept in good working order.
(2) Enclosed phosgene work areas shall be equipped with at 
least 2 exits, remote from each other, to allow escape into uncontaminated 
areas in case of emergency. Doors shall open outward.
(3) Unauthorized personnel shall be prohibited from 
entering areas where phosgene is handled or used.
(4) Wherever possible, phosgene installations shall be
outdoors. If it is necessary that such installations be indoors, workers 
should operate from a pressurized control room supplied with fresh air from 
an area remote from any possible source of phosgene contamination.
(5) For reentry purposes, at least 2 sets of self-contained 
breathing apparatus as specified in Table 1-1 shall be located outside each 
work area where phosgene is handled, used, stored, or formed. In case of 
emergency, they shall be accessible without entry into contaminated areas. 
Employees shall be trained and drilled in their use.
(6) Phosgene shut-off valves shall be conspicuously marked
and employees shall be familiarized with their use. Access to shut-off 
valves shall be unobstructed. Work areas shall be kept clean and orderly.
(f) Waste Disposal
(1) Disposal of waste phosgene shall conform to all 
applicable local, state, and federal regulations.
(2) Phosgene shall not be allowed to enter drains or sewers.
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(3) Appreciable discharges of phosgene shall be passed 
through an adequate decomposition system, such as a scrubbing tower 
utilizing sodium hydroxide or ammonium hydroxide, or through a sorbent 
system.
(4) Solid sorbents should be chosen so that desorption of 
phosgene is unlikely. Heating of the solid sorbent should be avoided.
(g) Confined Spaces
(1) Entry into confined spaces such as tanks, pits, tank 
cars, barges, process vessels, and tunnels shall be controlled by a permit 
system. Permits shall be signed by an authorized employer representative 
certifying that preparation of the confined space, precautionary measures, 
and personal protective equipment are adequate, and that precautions have 
been taken to ensure that prescribed procedures will be followed.
(2) Confined spaces which have contained phosgene shall be 
inspected and tested for oxygen deficiency, phosgene, and other 
contaminants and shall be thoroughly ventilated, cleaned, neutralized, and 
washed, as necessary, prior to entry.
(3) Inadvertent entry of phosgene into the confined space 
while work is in progress shall be prevented by disconnecting and blanking 
of phosgene supply lines.
(4) Confined spaces shall be ventilated while work is in 
progress to keep the concentration of any phosgene present below the 
standard and to prevent oxygen deficiency.
(5) Individuals entering confined spaces where they may be 
exposed to phosgene shall be equipped with adequate respirators and 
suitable harnesses with lifelines tended by another worker outside the
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space who shall also be equipped with the necessary protective equipment.
(h) Enclosed Spaces
Enclosed spaces (rooms, buildings, etc) which ordinarily are safe to 
enter but which, due to the failure of a system inside, could contain 
hazardous concentrations of phosgene should have a continuous automatic 
monitor (see Appendix III) set to sound an alarm which is audible inside 
and outside the enclosed space if phosgene concentrations exceed the 
ceiling concentration limit. A warning light is recommended as a 
substitute for a bell in noisy areas. If such areas are not monitored in 
this way, they shall be entered only if the worker is under observation by
a coworker and if the worker has in his possession a respirator suitable
for escape.
(i) Miscellaneous
Unless the potential for inadvertent phosgene generation is
anticipated and engineering controls are implemented, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons shall not be exposed to high temperatures or ultraviolet 
radiation.
Section 7 - Sanitation Practices
(a) Plant sanitation shall meet the requirements of 29 CFR 
1910.141.
(b) Escape routes near phosgene control equipment shall be kept
clear, reflecting general good housekeeping practices.
(c) Appropriate locker rooms shall be available for changing into 
required protective clothing in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.141(e). 
Clothing contaminated with liquid phosgene shall be immediately removed and
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placed in a closed container in a well-ventilated area for later disposal 
or decontamination.
(d) Food should not be stored, prepared, dispensed, or eaten in
phosgene work areas.
Section 8 - Monitoring and Recordkeeping Requirements
(a) Workroom areas where it has been determined, on the basis of 
an industrial hygiene survey or the judgment of a compliance officer, that 
environmental levels of phosgene are less than half of the TWA limit should 
not be considered to have phosgene exposure. Records of these surveys, 
including the basis for concluding that air levels of phosgene are below 
half of the TWA limit, shall be maintained until a new survey is conducted.
(b) Area Monitoring
Continuous automatic monitoring is recommended in any work area where 
an initial industrial hygiene survey indicates that a potential phosgene 
exposure exists. Such monitoring devices (see Appendix III) should have an 
audible or a visible alarm (light) which is triggered whenever the ceiling 
concentration limit is exceeded.
(c) Personal Monitoring
(1) Initial Monitoring
Within 6 months of the promulgation of this standard, each
employer who has a place of employment in which phosgene is stored, 
handled, used, or formed shall design and implement a monitoring program 
which shall identify and measure or permit calculation of the exposure of 
all employees exposed to phosgene.
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(2) Normal Monitoring
(A) Routine monitoring of employee exposure shall be 
conducted at 3-month intervals unless otherwise indicated by a professional 
industrial hyglenist and whenever introduction of a production, process, or 
control change indicates a need for réévaluation.
(B) If an employee monitoring program measurement 
reveals that an employee is exposed in excess of the recommended 
environmental limits, the exposure of that employee shall be measured at 
least once every 2 weeks, control measures required by Section 6(b) shall 
be implemented, and the employee shall be notified. When two consecutive 
biweekly determinations reveal that employee exposure no longer exceeds 
either of the recommended environmental limits, routine monitoring may be 
resumed.
(3) Exposure Measurement
In all personal monitoring, samples representative of the 
exposure in the breathing zone of the employee shall be collected.
Procedures for sampling, calibration of equipment, and analysis of phosgene 
samples shall be as provided in Appendices I and II, or by any method shown
to be equivalent in precision, accuracy, and sensitivity to the methods
specified.
An adequate number of samples shall be collected to permit
construction of a TWA and peak exposure value for every operation or 
process. Variations in work and production schedules shall be considered 
in deciding when samples are to be collected. The minimum number of
representative TWA determinations for an operation or process shall be 
based on the number of workers exposed as provided in Table 1-2, or as




Number of Employees Exposed Number of TWA Determinations
1 - 20 50% of the total
number of workers
21 - 100 10 plus 25% of the
excess over 20 workers
Over 100 30 plus 5% of the excess
over 100 workers
(d) Recordkeeping
Employers shall maintain records of any accidental phosgene release 
requiring evacuation, and results of all exposure measurements,
environmental surveys, and medical examinations performed as required by 
Section 2 of this chapter. Such records shall indicate the type of 
personal protective devices, if any, in use at the time of sampling. 
Records of environmental monitoring shall be maintained and shall be
available to the authorized representatives of the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, and of the Secretary of Labor. Each employee shall
be able to obtain information on his own environmental exposure. Such
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This report presents the criteria and the recommended standard based 
thereon which were prepared to meet the need for preventing occupational 
diseases arising from exposure to phosgene. The criteria document fulfills 
the responsibility of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
under Section 20(a)(3) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to 
"...develop criteria dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical 
agents and substances which will describe...exposure levels at which no 
employee will suffer impaired health or functional capacities or diminished 
life expectancy as a result of his work experience...."
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 
after a review of data and consultation with others, formalized a system 
for the development of criteria upon which standards can be established to 
protect the health of workers from exposure to hazardous chemical and 
physical agents. It should be pointed out that any criteria and 
recommended standard should enable management and labor to develop better 
engineering controls resulting in more healthful work environments. Simply 
complying with the recommended standard should not be the final goal.
These criteria for a standard for phosgene are part of a continuing 
series of criteria developed by NIOSH. The proposed standard applies to 
the processing, manufacture, use of, or other occupational exposure to 
phosgene as applicable under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970. The standard was not designed for the population-at-large, and any 
extrapolation beyond occupational exposures is not warranted. It is 
intended to (1) protect against injury from phosgene, (2) be measurable by 
techniques that are valid, reproducible, and available to industry and
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official agencies, and (3) be attainable with existing technology.
The development of the recommended standard for occupational exposure 
to phosgene has revealed deficiencies in the data base in the following 
areas:
(1) epidemiologic studies of workers exposed to phosgene
for extended periods;
(2) chronic animal exposure studies at low levels of
phosgene;
(3) improvement of the sensitivity of sampling and
analytical methods for personal monitoring;
(4) testing of automatic, continuous monitoring systems and
associated alarms.
These gaps in our knowledge of phosgene should be filled.
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III. BIOLOGIC EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE
Extent of Exposure
Phosgene is a colorless gas at normal temperatures and pressure. 
When liquified under pressure or refrigeration, it is a colorless-to-light 
yellow liquid. [1] In low concentrations, its odor has been variously 
described as resembling that of musty hay [2] or green corn. [3] Phosgene 
is easily manufactured by passing chlorine and excess carbon monoxide over 
activated carbon. [3] Shortages of chlorine and attendant high prices have 
somewhat restricted the manufacture of phosgene in recent years. [4] Some 
phosgene can also be produced by the decomposition of chlorinated 
hydrocarbons by heat or by ultraviolet radiation. [5,6,7,8,9] Relevant 
properties of phosgene are presented in Table XIII-1. [1,2,10,11,12]
Phosgene was first used as a chemical warfare agent during World War 
I. Its use in industry is a relatively recent development. [3] 
Accordingly, much of the literature on phosgene is concerned with its 
military applications. Phosgene production in the United States in 1957, 
the first year the US Tariff Commission started reporting phosgene output, 
was only 5 million pounds. [3] In 1967, production reached 350 million 
pounds, [3] in 1971, 530 million pounds, [13] while in 1972, it had
increased to 657 million pounds. [14] In contrast to these figures, sales 
in 1971 were only 11,215,000 pounds [13] and 11,678,000 pounds in 1972.
[14] The apparent discrepancy between production and sales is due to the 
fact that the major portion of the phosgene manufactured is for "captive" 
use (use by the phosgene manufacturer), while the relatively small 
remainder is sold. [3] In 1974, phosgene was being produced in 18 plants
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and capacity was on the increase. [4] It has been estimated that demand 
will be 1,630 million pounds in 1978. [4]
The relatively recent revitalization of the phosgene industry and the 
rapidly increasing demand are due largely to the use of phosgene in the 
synthesis of isocyanates, which are starting materials for polyurethane 
resins. Production of isocyanates accounted for about 75% of all phosgene 
produced in 1967. [3] In 1974, the uses of phosgene were distributed as
follows: production of toluene diisocyanate, 62%; other polymeric
isocyanates, 23%; polycarbonates, 6%; pesticides, carbonates, and 
"specialties," 9%. [4]
Some occupations with potential exposure to phosgene are listed in 
Table XIII-2. [15] NIOSH estimates that 10,000 workers have potential 
occupational exposure to phosgene during its manufacture and use.
Historical Reports
Berghoff [16] reported his observations of 2,000 cases of exposure to 
war gases during World War I. These included chlorine, mustard gas, and 
phosgene. The main complaint expressed by those exposed to phosgene was a 
weakness which developed as early as 2 hours or as late as 3 days after 
exposure. This weakness lasted for weeks or months. The author also noted 




Wells et al [17] published a detailed report on effects of barely 
detectable concentrations of phosgene on humans. Fifty-six military 
personnel, without upper respiratory problems, were exposed to increasing 
concentrations of phosgene until all the subjects could detect phosgene by 
odor. The authors reported that 50% of "technically trained" (without 
further clarification) observers detected phosgene at a concentration of 
6.1 mg/cu m (1.5 ppm). Thirty-nine percent detected it at a concentration 
of 4.7 mg/cu m (1.2 ppm). None detected it below a concentration of 1.5 
mg/cu m (0.4 ppm). The authors exposed the subjects to phosgene in 
increasing concentrations until they detected an odor. No effort was made 
to distinguish phosgene from other odors. No effects other than odor 
detection were reported.
Leonardos et al [18] studied phosgene odor thresholds using a panel 
of 4 members. The odor threshold was defined as the first concentration at 
which all 4 members recognized the odor. They distinguished this from the 
"detection threshold" which they felt was neither reliable nor 
reproducible. They determined a "hay-like" odor threshold for phosgene of 
1.0 ppm.
Thiess and Goldmann [19] described their experience with 109 cases of 
accidental phosgene inhalation, including one fatality, in one industrial 
plant. The patients reported that they were exposed to only 1 or 2 whiffs 
of phosgene each, but some exposures were probably more severe. No further 
quantitation was described by the authors. Of these cases, 70 had 
insignificant clinical problems, hence were not studied in detail by the 
industrial physician. No details were given concerning these so-called
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insignificant complaints. Of 31 cases in which X-ray studies were 
performed after exposure, 5 showed pulmonary abnormalities upon 
radiological examination. Only 3 of these showed the characteristic 
picture of pulmonary edema. The authors reported that the patients 
followed the "typical symptoms and course of phosgene poisoning: after an
almost unnoticed inhalation,...a certain symptom-free latent period of 2 to 
8 hours follows, and then the typical pulmonary edema (occurs)...." These 
three cases were described in detail.
A 19-year-old chemical laboratory assistant was accidentally sprayed 
with an unknown volume of liquid phosgene. The gas mask he was wearing was 
not leakproof, hence phosgene penetrated the mask. The mask and upper 
clothing were removed inmediately. No first aid was administered. Upon 
admission to the hospital a little more than half an hour after exposure, 
the patient was observed to be in respiratory distress. Chest films showed 
infiltration of the lungs and pulmonary edema. Therapy consisted of 
phlebotomy, digitalization, intravenous fluids, and antibiotics. Three 
weeks of hospitalization were required before the patient could return 
home. No sequelae were described.
A 20-year-old chemical laboratory assistant was sprayed in the face 
with chlorobenzene saturated with phosgene under pressure. It was
estimated that one mole of gaseous phosgene was released during the
accident. First aid consisted only of washing the face and hair in water.
Five hours after exposure, the patient felt a slight pressure on his chest.
Eight hours after exposure, he became dyspneic and expectorated bloody 
sputum. He was admitted to the hospital one hour later. Chest films 
showed pulmonary edema. Thirteen days of hospitalization, which included
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treatment with corticosteroids, digitalis, and oxygen, were required to 
resolve his pulmonary problems.
The fatal accident involved a 55-year-old mason who was presumed to 
have been exposed to phosgene released by chipping of brick which had 
possibly adsorbed phosgene. In this case, phosgene was a byproduct in the 
production of aluminum chloride. An analysis of the apparatus the patient 
worked on revealed that 2.5 liters of interstitial air volume in the brick
at 360-400 C was available for absorbing the phosgene. The amount of dust
inhaled by the patient is unknown. He was exposed for 30 minutes and first 
complained of dyspnea about 2 hours after completing the job. No first aid 
was given. Five hours after exposure, he was admitted to the hospital in 
severe respiratory distress. Chest films showed pulmonary edema. Despite 
phlebotomy and treatment with digitalis and diuretics, the patient died of 
acute right heart failure about 14 hours after his initial exposure.
Two cases of phosgene exposure were reported by Gerritsen and Busch- 
mann. [6] They were due to accidental formation of phosgene from
chlorinated hydrocarbons. Both cases involved the use of chemical paint
removers in poorly ventilated areas heated by portable kerosene stoves. 
The first case involved a 52-year-old man who was exposed for an unknown 
period. He noted respiratory irritation soon after beginning work but 
persisted working for several hours. Chest symptoms occurred thereafter 
and the patient, upon examination, exhibited signs of pulmonary congestion. 
Approximately 5 hours later, the patient went into frank pulmonary edema 
and died within a few hours. Autopsy showed extensive degenerative changes 
in the epithelium of the trachea, bronchi, and bronchioli, together with 
hemorrhagic edematous focal pneumonia.
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The second case [6] involved a 38-year-old woman, in her 7th month of 
pregnancy, who was exposed in a similar manner for 3 hours in the 
afternoon. That evening hemoptysis occurred. The next morning, symptoms 
worsened and she was hospitalized. A chest film upon admission showed 
pulmonary edema. After 8 days' hospitalization, she was released even 
though her chest film did not yet show a complete return to normal. After 
2 months, she gave birth to a healthy child. This is the only case found 
which reported phosgene exposure during pregnancy.
In attempting to reproduce the circumstances of exposure of the above 
2 cases, [6] it was found that methylene chloride was rapidly decomposed 
with phosgene being the main decomposition product when methylene chloride 
was exposed to heat in a poorly ventilated area. The authors stated that 
this was in contrast to the results reported by Little [20] when methylene 
chloride was decomposed by hot surfaces and low amounts of phosgene were 
produced in comparison with hydrogen chloride and chlorine.
Another case of possible phosgene poisoning resulting in death was 
reported by Spolyar et al. [5] The case involved a chlorinated solvent 
degreaser which was inadvertently filled with trichloroethylene instead of 
perchloroethylene. The operator of the degreaser was found dead 3 1/2
hours after exposure began and 1 hour after he reported that fumes were 
escaping from the apparatus. Autopsy showed pulmonary edema consistent 
with exposure to phosgene. It was assumed that the trichloroethylene 
vaporized and passed through the firebox of a nearby space heater, with 
decomposition of the trichloroethylene and the production of phosgene. 
Cause of death was consistent with phosgene exposure but it was suggested 
that trichloroethylene might have contributed to the circulatory collapse.
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An attempt was made to reproduce the environmental situation. [5] Sampling 
of the breathing zone of the operator revealed a phosgene concentration of 
15 ppm. The analytical method was altered to correct for interferences by 
trichloroethylene at 3,300 ppm in air, the estimated trichloroethylene 
concentration at the time of exposure. During the test simulation, 
trichloroethylene levels exceeded 10,000 ppm after 1 hour and 20 minutes of 
degreaser operation.
Glass et al [21] reported a case of poisoning attributed to phosgene 
following the welding of a metal which was damp with trichloroethylene used 
for cleaning purposes. After 4 1/2 hours' exposure, the worker noted
respiratory symptoms and felt unwell. He returned home, but the next 
morning he was dyspneic. Chest films taken 24 hours after exposure and 90 
days later showed the diaphragm below the eleventh rib posteriorly with 
limited excursion and clear lung fields. Pulmonary function tests, 
including spirometry, carbon monoxide uptake, and arterial blood gases, 
abnormal at first, improved over a 3-month period following exposure. The 
authors' impression was that the patient suffered from chronic bronchitis 
which was exacerbated by phosgene. Unfortunately, no studies of phosgene 
in the air were conducted in the workplace under conditions simulating that 
of the original exposure.
Derrick and Johnson [22] reported a case of presumed phosgene 
exposure due to tfhe breakdown of trichloroethylene by cigarette smoking. 
The patient had worked as a drycleaner for 3 months. Studies indicated 
that the average concentration of trichloroethylene in the room was 488 
ppm. The authors indicated that this level would be exceeded when clothing 
was removed from the cleaning machine. The patient was known to smoke 40
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cigarettes/day. He frequently smoked in the cleaning room. He left work 
at 4:00 p.m., and about 90 minutes later he collapsed and died. An autopsy 
showed pulmonary edema. Phosgene was believed to have been generated by 
the decomposition of trichloroethylene in contact with the hot tip of a 
burning cigarette. This theory is contradicted by the work of Little [20] 
who measured phosgene in the effluent gas of cigarettes and did not detect 
any in atmospheres containing trichloroethylene, chloroform, carbon 
tetrachloride, perchloroethylene, or even small amounts of phosgene.
Everett and Overholt [23] reported a case of phosgene poisoning but 
gave no details of exposure other than "massive exposure to phosgene." 
Initial symptoms were burning of the eyes and coughing. These cleared 
after a few minutes, but dyspnea occurred in 3 hours. X-ray studies showed 
pulmonary edema which resolved over 7 days of hospitalization and treatment 
which included antibiotics, corticosteroids, and oxygen. The patient 
remained well during the ensuing 2 years.
The Bureau of Engineering Safety, Department of Labor and Industry, 
State of New Jersey, [24] reported one fatality among 6 employees exposed 
to phosgene at unknown concentrations in separate accidents over a 2-year 
period. The exposures occurred in a plant conducting "phosgenation" where 
measurements of air concentrations were normally reported to be below 0.1 
ppm. Subsequently, all phosgene operations were stopped because of 
inadequate engineering controls.
Delepine [25] described 2 cases of fatal phosgene poisoning. The 
first man had his clothing saturated with phosgene and was treated almost 
immediately. He appeared well but experienced symptoms 6 hours after 
exposure. Treatment (details not given) was temporarily helpful, but the
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patient died 11 hours later. The second man was exposed as a result of the 
explosion of a phosgene cylinder. Death occurred 22 hours after exposure. 
At autopsy, both cases showed evidence of severe irritation of the 
respiratory tract with almost complete shedding of the laryngeal, tracheal, 
and bronchial epithelium.
English [8] reported a case of poisoning attributed to phosgene in a 
67-year-old male with several years* history of chronic bronchitis and a 
quiescent duodenal ulcer. After an 8-hour exposure in a room heated by a 
stove burning paraffin in which paint-strippers containing chlorinated 
hydrocarbons had been used, the worker experienced dyspnea. The next
morning, his symptoms increased and he was hospitalized. Chest X-rays
showed diffuse bronchiolitis. Despite treatment, dyspnea persisted for 4 
days in the hospital. He was discharged after 6 weeks. English stated 
that phosgene dissolved in saliva irritated the alimentary mucosa and, 
hence, was responsible for reactivation of a duodenal ulcer in this 
patient. He cited no authorities for this statement or clinical or 
experimental evidence to support it. No other references to the effects of 
phosgene on gastrointestinal mucosa were found other than Cherkes' [26]
statement that stasis and venous hyperemia occur in the gastrointestinal 
tract as a result of pulmonary edema.
Seidelin [7] reported a case of probable phosgene inhalation leading 
to pulmonary edema in a 16-year-old woman. This occurred after she had 
used a carbon tetrachloride fire extinguisher in an enclosed space. 
Inhalation of smoke and fumes resulted in immediate coughing. Six hours 
later, she developed respiratory symptoms and subsequently was admitted to 
the hospital with pulmonary edema. Complications ensued including
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mediastinal emphysema and bilateral pneumothoraces. Oxygen therapy
resulted in considerable clinical improvement in 8 days, but she was unable 
to leave the hospital until 13 days after exposure.
Stavrakis [27] described 7 cases of phosgene exposure. The first was
a worker who developed dyspnea, cough, and chest pain 4 hours after
exposure, which were severe enough to bring him to a hospital emergency 
room. Treatment with hexamethylenetetramine was given immediately, 
followed by standard therapy consisting of steroids, oxygen, and 
antibiotics. He was discharged in good health after 5 days. The other 6 
workers were exposed when a pipe ruptured and released phosgene. The 
extent of exposure was not described. One heavily exposed worker was 
treated immediately with hexamethylenetetramine. He remained asymptomatic 
until his discharge 24 hours later. Another worker, similarly exposed, 
waited until symptoms occurred before seeking treatment. He died despite 
treatment with hexamethylenetetramine. Pour others, who were treated in 
the symptomatic stage, required hospitalization for various periods until 
recovery occurred.
In 1946, Galdston et al [28] reported studies of 6 cases of acute 
exposure to phosgene with residual effects up to 19 months after the last 
known acute exposure. Evaluation of each patient included physical 
examinations, chest X-rays, pulmonary function tests, and a psychiatric 
summary. These cases shared a common background of brief single exposures 
to phosgene at unknown concentrations which usually led to delayed 
pulmonary edema. One of the cases is interesting in that exposure occurred 
at a hood which contained an ampule of only 40 ml phosgene. All were 
treated at Johns Hopkins Hospital and released, some returning to a normal
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work routine. However, follow-up examinations revealed that all had 
lingering complaints, and although physical examinations and chest X-rays 
up to 19 months later were generally normal, pulmonary function tests 
always revealed some abnormalities consistent with beginning pulmonary 
emphysema. The authors felt that psychological factors contributed to the 
lingering symptomatology. Their findings are summarized in Table III-l.
Cherkes, [26] in an extensive review of the literature concerning the 
clinical course of acute phosgene exposure, noted that most fatalities 
occur during the first 24-48 hours. He reported that most patients dying 
within the first 72 hours died of pulmonary edema or cardiac problems. 
Those dying later usually succumbed as a result of complications, such as 
infection (usually pulmonary), thrombosis, or embolism. He gave no source 
for these statements other than "according to the data of various authors." 
The clinical course following phosgene exposure reported by Cherkes is 
generally in agreement with other reports following human and animal 
exposure. [5,6,21,25,27,29,30,31]
Ardran [32] pointed out that many victims of phosgene poisoning 
showed radiological evidence of increased lung volumes. His experiments 
with dogs [33] indicated that animals that failed to develop an increase in 
lung volume after phosgene exposure also failed to develop pulmonary edema. 
This test had been used by him clinically. [32] He reported that, if an 
expiratory lung film shows evidence of an increase in volume after exposure 
to phosgene, then pulmonary edema may be expected. He stated that he had 
looked for this sign in humans exposed to lung irritants and that never, in 
20 years, had he found pulmonary edema to develop in the absence of 
antecedent increased lung volume. There has been no independent
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TABLE III-l
SUMMARY OF CLINICAL OBSERVATIONS AND DATA ON STUDIES PERFORMED
AFTER ACUTE EXPOSURES
Case Number* 1 2 3 4 5 6
Age 38 39 30 48 43 49
Months after accident** 14 6 6 3 5 5
Months worked with phosgene 6 12 18 24 2 1
Chronic symptoms A N N A A A
Physical signs
Acute A A A A N N
Chronic N N N B N N
Roentgenogram of chest N N N N N N
Volume
(Vital capacity N N N A N N
+ % residual air) =
Total capacity B N N B N N
Intrapulmonary mixing of gases N N B A N B
Pulmonary emptying N N N A N B
Resting pattern of breathing
High rate N A A A A A
Low tidal air N N A B A A
High min. volume N A A A A A
Low oxygen extraction B A A B A A
Exercise pattern of breathing
High rate N B B B A A
Low tidal air B N B B N A
Low oxygen extraction N N N B A A
Arterial blood
At rest N A N N A N
After exercise N A N N N -
After oxygen administration - N - N A -
Breath holding N N N A A N
Voluntary breathing capacity N A A N A N
Postural tests N N N N N N
Cardiac output N A N N N
A = Definitely abnormal B = Borderline abnormal
N = Normal - = Not done
* Listed in order of severity of exposure.
** Applies to all special studies except arterial blood and alveolar air
oxygen and carbon dioxide tensions and cardiac output which were performed 
4-8 months later. Symptoms, physical and X-ray findings were unchanged 
on reexamination of all available patients (except No. 5) 4-8 months later. 
From reference 28
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confirmation of his interesting findings, and he gave no pulmonary function 
test data on his patients.
Steel [34] described 2 cases of exposure to phosgene at low 
concentrations (figures for duration or concentration not stated). Both 
patients developed delirium, fever, tachycardia, tachypnea, and a painful 
cough. The more exposed patient developed pulmonary edema; the other
showed only acute bronchitis. Steel noted that both patients developed
amnesia about their exposure. He stated that he regarded neither fever nor 
amnesia as characteristic of exposure to phosgene.
One of the few publications relating to workers with multiple 
exposures to phosgene at low concentrations over prolonged periods is that 
of Galdston et al. [35] Their observations are summarized in Table III-2. 
The study involved the pulmonary function, cardiovascular and psychiatric 
status of 5 workers who had repeated exposures to small amounts of phosgene 
during the course of 18-42 months. In none of the cases was notation made
of odor detection by the patients during exposure, prior to the development
of more serious symptoms. The first patient, age 32, had a noncontributory 
past history except for conjunctivitis and laryngitis after working with 
mustard gas during 2 time periods. Several exposures to phosgene caused a 
feeling of chest constriction, dizziness, headaches, blurred vision, and 
mental confusion. The same year, he experienced severe irritation of the 
throat from inhaling chlorine. He worked with phosgene for another 4 
months and noted chest tightness, dyspnea on exertion, and muscular 
twitching he ascribed to recent minor exposures to phosgene. The findings 
of his physical examination and chest roentgenogram were normal; however, 
pulmonary function studies showed a decrease in vital capacity, impaired
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intrapulmonary gas mixing and other changes consistent with pulmonary 
emphysema.
The second patient, [35] age 50, also had a noncontributory past 
history prior to working with phosgene. He had had numerous minor 
exposures to phosgene which were usually followed by a sense of 
constriction in the throat, dyspnea, cough, nausea, and vomiting. After 
working with phosgene, he had a productive cough which occasionally tasted 
of phosgene. Findings from his physical examination were normal, but his 
chest roentgenogram and pulmonary function studies were consistent with 
pulmonary emphysema.
The third patient, [35] age 24, had had a history of asthma since 
childhood. He had several minor exposures to chlorine before working with 
phosgene. On 6 occasions, he inhaled enough phosgene to induce coughing, 
choking sensations, nausea and vomiting, headache, and sweating, which 
disappeared the day following exposure. Physical examination demonstrated 
only thoracic kyphosis and bilateral basilar rales. Roentgenograms and 
pulmonary function studies were consistent with pulmonary emphysema.
The fourth patient, [35] age 31, had chronic tonsillitis, otitis, and 
adenoiditis apparently prior to his phosgene exposure. He also had minor 
symptomatic episodes of exposure to chlorine and mustard gas. After about 
6-9 months of exposure to phosgene, physical examination showed a 
perforated right eardrum and bilateral basilar rales. Roentgenograms of 
the lungs showed what was described as an old obliteration of the left 
costophrenic angle. Pulmonary function studies were consistent with 
pulmonary emphysema.
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The fifth patient, [35] age 26, had worked with both phosgene and 
chlorine during separate periods. He had a few minor exposures to phosgene 
which resulted in conjunctival irritation, dyspnea, and headache. Physical 
examination and roentgenographic studies were normal. Pulmonary function 
studies showed only a reduction in voluntary breathing capacity. The 
authors concluded that "emphysema of the lungs may develop after chronic 
exposure to phosgene."
This study is an important one in that it deals directly with the 
problem of repeated minor exposures to phosgene. Unfortunately, Galdston 
et al [35] did not comment on how these patients were selected or on any 
quantitation of the phosgene exposures. This paper also did not consider 
continuous exposures at a low level of phosgene during a full workday and 
workweek over an extended period. It is, however, the only paper available 
with clinical and laboratory data collected on humans with repeated 
exposures to phosgene, (see Table III-2)
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TABLE III-2
SUMMARY OF CLINICAL OBSERVATIONS AND DATA ON STUDIES PERFORMED
AFTER CHRONIC EXPOSURES
Case Number* 1 2 3 4 5
Age 32 50 24 31 26
Months worked with phosgene 42 36 30 16 30
Chronic symptoms A A A A A
Physical signs
Acute N N N N N
Chronic N B A N N
Roentgenogram of chest N A A N N
Volume
(Vital capacity A N B N N
+ % residual air) =
Total capacity A B A B N
Intrapulmonary mixing of gases A A A A N
Pulmonary emptying N B A A N
Resting pattern of breathing
High rate N A A A N
Low tidal air N A A B N
High min. volume N A A A N
Low oxygen extraction N N B A N
Exercise pattern of breathing
High rate N B B B N
Low tidal air N B B B N
Low oxygen extraction N N A A N
Arterial blood gases**
At rest N A N N -
After exercise N N A A -
After oxygen administration N - - - -
Breath holding N A - N N
Voluntary breathing capacity N A A N A
Postural tests N - - - -
Cardiac output N A N N —
A = Definitely abnormal B = Borderline abnormal
N = Normal - = Not done
* Listed in order studied
** Arterial blood oxygen, alveolar air oxygen and carbon dioxide tension 
studies at rest and after exercise were performed 4-8 months after all 
other studies were completed. Symptoms, physical and roentgenographic 
findings were unchanged on reexamination of all available patients (all 




Levina et al [36] described the working environment in the monuron, 
3—(p—chlorophenyl)-l,1-dimethylurea, industry. Phosgene is involved in its 
synthesis and was found to be contaminating 90 workers1 production areas at 
a concentration of 1.0—2.0 mg/cu m (JO. 2 5 —0 .5 ppm) over a 6—month period 
under investigation. According to Smelyanskiy and Ulanova, [37] the 
permissible level for the USSR was 0.5 mg/cu m (0.125 ppm). Other 
contaminants included chlorobenzene, dimethylamine, and parachloro-
phenylisocyanate. Levina et al [36] reported no pulmonary problems in 
these workers, but did not describe searching for them.
Levina and Kurando [38] reported their studies of a plant 
manufacturing a weed killer (isopropylphenylcarbamate) using phosgene,
isopropyl alcohol, aniline, and caustic soda as raw materials. Although a 
closed process was used, phosgene was found in 30% of all air samples, most 
frequently at a concentration of 0.5 mg/cu m (0.125 ppm). A total of 89 
workers were studied for evidence of hematological abnormalities. 
Methemoglobinemia and anemia were detected which were attributed to the 
weed killer and aniline. No mention was made of pulmonary problems.
At a plant where phosgene is manufactured, the medical records of all 
exposed workers (326) were compared with those of 6,288 nonexposed workers. 
(AF Myers, written communication, November 1974) Pulmonary function, lung 
problems, and deaths related to lung problems were tabulated for both 
groups. The data were taken to indicate that there were no chronic lung 
problems related to working in these phosgene operations. By using the age
distribution of employees and pensioners and comparing their deaths from
lung problems with those expected from a similar age group (described as
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taken from National Statistics) not exposed to phosgene, no increase in 
lung-related deaths was noted in the phosgene-industry workers. The 
details of pulmonary function testing were not provided. The results of a 
limited program of air sampling conducted during a 2-month period were 
provided. Fifteen personal air samples collected for 20-minute periods and 
analyzed using the NBP method used by AF Myers (written communication, 
November 1975) and described in Chapter IV of this document showed
concentrations ranging from nondetected to 0.08 mg/cu m with an average 
concentration of 0.012 mg/cu m. From a total of 56 fixed-position samples 
collected for 2-hour or 20-minute periods, 51 samples showed concentrations 
ranging from nondetected to 0.52 mg/cu m (ND-0.13 ppm). The remaining 5 
samples showed "off-scale" measurements (greater than 0.55 mg/cu m)
reportedly due to leaks.
Animal Toxicity
Clay and Rossing [39] exposed 25 mongrel dogs to phosgene at a
concentration between 24 and 40 ppm for 30-minute periods at a rate of 1-3 
exposures/week. Those exposed once or twice showed acute bronchiolitis and 
peribronchiolitis involving terminal and respiratory bronchioles. The 
trachea and bronchi were visually unaffected and the proximal bronchioles 
were seldom damaged. Those exposed 4-10 times had chronic bronchiolitis of 
the proximal and intermediate portions of the respiratory bronchioles. The 
animals exposed 30-40 times showed changes which were described as 
resembling those of early emphysema.
Box and Cullumbine [40] studied the problem of an apparent reduction 
in susceptibility to phosgene intoxication by prior exposure. They exposed
44
rats for 10 minutes to phosgene at concentrations of 80 mg/cu m (20 ppm). 
Five days later, the preexposed animals and an equal number of control 
animals were exposed to phosgene at lethal concentrations (230-440 mg/cu m, 
55-110 ppm) for 10 minutes. The mortality rate for controls was 74%, while 
for pregassed animals it was only 33%. They attributed this finding to 
rapid and shallow breathing caused by pulmonary damage in the first 
exposure.
Rinehart and Hatch, [41] using low concentrations of phosgene (0.5-4 
ppm for 5-480 minutes) on rats, attempted to work out the validity of the 
concentration-time product (Ct) in ppm-minutes as a measure of dose of 
sublethal exposures to phosgene. On the basis of the responses (expressed 
in terms of impaired pulmonary gas exchange capacity as measured by the 
decreased rates of uptake of carbon monoxide and ether) of 118 Wistar rats, 
the authors concluded that the Ct was a suitable way to express the 
magnitude of the dose, and that low-level exposure to phosgene with a Ct 
equal to or less than 100 ppm-minutes caused increased resistance to 
breathing and poorer distribution of air within the lungs. Above a Ct of 
100 ppm-minutes, decrease in diffusion capacity became more important. 
They attributed this to differences in the major site of action, ie, the 
respiratory bronchioles in the first case, and the alveoli in the second. 
The authors noted that above a Ct of 30 ppm-minutes gas exchange capacity 
decreased directly with the logarithmic increase in Ct. Rinehart and Hatch 
[41] noted no significant effect of phosgene on the test animals' pulmonary 
performance when subjected to exposures less than a Ct of 30 ppm-minutes. 
The animals' exposures were varied to cover a Ct product range of 12-360 
ppm-minutes.
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Gross et al [42] studied the effect of low concentrations (0.5-4 ppm 
for 5-480 minutes) on rats. They found that they could produce a chronic 
pneumonitis which was reversible but left detectable lesions for up to 3 
months. They felt they could explain this by the fact that low dosages of 
phosgene merely irritated the pulmonary alveolar epithelium, resulting in 
proliferation. The more severe exposures of phosgene usually reported in 
the literature destroyed the surface epithelium and attacked the underlying 
alveolar capillaries, thus resulting in pulmonary edema. The authors noted 
that the severity of the chronic pneumonitis correlated well with the Ct 
value of the phosgene exposure and seemed to be largely independent of the 
concentration of the gas in the same bracket of Ct values. Animals in the 
study by Gross et al [42] were subjected to Ct products ranging from 13 to 
360 ppm-minutes. In the 18 rats exposed to phosgene with Ct products equal 
to 30 ppm-minutes or less, 5 (28%) showed no abnormalities on pathologic 
examination; 11 (61%) showed slight chronic pneumonitis; and 2 (11%) showed 
moderate chronic pneumonitis.
Wirth [43] studied the effect of low concentrations of phosgene upon 
cats. He reported that, if the concentration was expressed as mg/cu m, the 
lethal concentration x the survival time in minutes was approximately 
1,000. At low concentrations (5-7 mg/cu m, 1-2 ppm), the constant was as 
high as 3,000. This shows that the lethal Ct product is considerably 
higher at low concentrations. The author felt that the increase in Ct 
product at low concentrations was due to detoxification and that the 
practical usefulness of the Ct formula was not affected by this, provided 
it was used within certain concentration limits.
46
Cordier and Cordier [44] exposed cats and guinea pigs to phosgene at 
concentrations of 20-25 mg/cu m (5.0-6.25 ppm) and 10-15 mg/cu m (2.5-3.75 
ppm) repeatedly over several weeks. The duration of each exposure was 10 
minutes. The interval between exposures was 24 hours, and the number of 
exposures varied from 2 to 41. Examination of the animals concentrated on 
body weight, organ weight, and microscopic examination of the lungs. After 
exposure at 20-25 mg/cu m, all animals developed pulmonary lesions, 
although signs of these were not detected while the animals were alive. 
Microscopic examination of the 15 cats exposed indicated that all but two 
had some degree of pulmonary edema. The remaining two showed other lung 
abnormalities. The degree of lung damage did not show any increase with 
increasing number of exposures. Therefore the authors concluded that there 
is no cumulative effect of phosgene at this concentration when the duration 
of exposure is short and the animals are given time to recover between 
exposures. Both cats and guinea pigs were exposed to phosgene at the lower 
range of concentrations of 10-15 mg/cu m. Upon microscopic examination, 
pulmonary edema was found in 3 of 6 cats and in none of 6 guinea pigs. 
Other lung changes were found, but, in general, the effect on the pulmonary 
alveoli was considered to be insignificant. The authors concluded that 
this concentration, inhaled daily for 10 minutes, seems to be the minimal 
concentration capable of creating edematous pulmonary zones. This minimum 
effect level, expressed as a Ct product (25—37.5 ppm—minutes) concurs with 
the minimum effect level of 30 ppm—minutes later found by Rinehart and 
Hatch [41] in experiments with rats using pulmonary uptake of carbon 
monoxide and ether to measure effect.
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Koontz [45] gassed dogs with phosgene at the minimum lethal dose 
(undefined by the author) and then studied 95 of those that survived. One- 
third died or were killed by other dogs during the course of the
experiment. The other two-thirds were killed at intervals from 2 to 60
weeks. About one-half of the dogs showed no or only minor lesions. Those 
with more significant abnormalities showed transient bronchial plugging and 
adjacent atelectasis. Most of the lungs took on a more normal appearance 
as the time from recovery increased.
Durlacher and Bunting [46] exposed 31 dogs to phosgene at concen­
trations averaging 0.29 mg/ liter (72.0 ppm) for 30 minutes. The animals 
were given a variety of treatments, including oxygen, transfusions, or
venesection. The most striking findings were consolidation of one or more
lobes of the lungs 4-9 days after exposure. The authors noted that 
"pulmonary organization occurred...and caused high mortality in spite of 
oxygen therapy." The oxygen therapy consisted of maintenance in an 
atmosphere of 60% oxygen when the arterial oxygen saturation was below 80%. 
No specific time for initiation of therapy other than "after exposure" was 
given.
Gross et al [47] described their findings concerning pulmonary 
reactions to toxic gases. They noted that the proliferative lesions 
produced by phosgene, chlorine, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, 
and crotonaldehyde differed only quantitatively on a histologic basis. It 
appeared probable to the authors that, with a proper adjustment of the 
concentration, even the quantitative difference could be eliminated. They 
concluded that deep lung irritants preferentially attacked the respiratory 
bronchioles because of delayed clearance in that region.
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In 1920, Underhill [31] exposed dogs to phosgene and noted the 
development of pulmonary edema which was maximal at 24-36 hours and 
resolved in animals surviving 10 days or more. He concluded that the 
minimum lethal concentration of phosgene for dogs was 310-350 mg/cu m (75— 
87 ppm). He found that dogs that survived for 3 days usually recovered. 
He also concluded that recovery from gassing increased the likelihood of 
death from regassing of dogs, which differs from the findings of Box and 
Cullumbine [40] in rats. Underhill explained that tolerance is 
demonstrable only with low concentrations; it does not decrease subsequent 
reactions to lethal concentrations. Winternitz et al [48] presented 
detailed information on the pathology found in these animals at autopsy.
Long and Hatch [29] reported that a reduction in the rate of 
respiratory uptake of carbon monoxide was an early and sensitive test of 
pulmonary impairment following exposure to pulmonary irritants. The test 
was developed using unanesthetized rats and phosgene as the test irritant. 
The animals were exposed to phosgene for 30 minutes at the following 
levels: 0.5-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, and 4-5 ppm. The responses included a
decrease in pulmonary uptake in CO which was progressive for 6-8 hours, 
followed by gradual recovery. They found that their test detected changes 
even at the lowest level of phosgene exposure (0.5-1 ppm) in the absence of 
microscopic changes at autopsy.
Boyd and Perry [30] exposed rabbits to phosgene for 30 minutes at a 
concentration of 270 mg/cu m (67 ppm). They reported a latent period of 
several hours following exposure. After the latent period, pulmonary 
edema developed.
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Noweir et al [49] exposed rats to decomposition products of carbon 
tetrachloride at its TLV (10 ppm) and demonstrated [9] that up to 10 ppm of 
phosgene could be produced by thermal decomposition of this level of carbon 
tetrachloride. Thermal decomposition was achieved by passing a stream of 
carbon tetrachloride over a variety of hot surfaces including iron and
glass, as well as open flames. Animals were exposed for 12 or 60 minutes
to phosgene at concentrations of 10 or 2 ppm allowing an equal Ct of 120 
ppm-minutes. Mixtures of decomposition products were tested as well. No 
marked potentiation of each irritant's effects upon the others was
discovered. They found that chlorine, chlorine dioxide, and hydrogen 
chloride as well as phosgene contributed to respiratory damage.
Winternitz et al [50] studied the comparative pathology of acute
phosgene poisoning. They reported that the pathologic findings of acute 
phosgene poisoning were similar in goats, dogs, monkeys, rabbits, guinea 
pigs, rats, and mice. These findings consisted primarily of pulmonary 
edema which increased in severity with the length of survival of the 
species. The most susceptible species, monkeys and guinea pigs, died prior 
to the development of pulmonary edema as severe as that seen in the dog or 
goat.
The basic mechanism of action by which phosgene produces lung damage 
has, as yet, not been established. The original supposition that liberated 
HC1 was the toxic agent was never proved. A number of experiments carried 
out in World War II appear to have disproved the liberated HC1 hypothesis 
and shown that phosgene affects tissues because the carbonyl group combines 
with free amines of cell enzymes or other critical substances. [51] A more 
recent theory is that of Ivanhoe and Meyers [52] who exposed rabbits to
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phosgene at concentrations ranging from 50 ppm for 14 minutes to 200 ppm 
for 25 minutes. Their results showed a marked decrease in sympathetic 
nervous system activity in exposed animals. The authors concluded that 
phosgene toxicity was an example of acute pulmonary edema resulting from a 
hypoactive-sympathetic or neuroparalytic state in the host. This is 
corroborated, in part, by the work of Frosolono [53] who studied rat lungs 
by electron microscopy after exposures of 1,000 ppm-minutes to 4,320 ppm- 
minutes. The author noted interstitial edema as the common denominator of 
phosgene poisoning and felt that the autonomic nervous system might indeed 
play a significant role.
Cameron and Foss [54] exposed a group of animals to phosgene at an 
average concentration of 4.38 mg/cu m (1.1 ppm) for 5 hours/day for 5 days. 
The animal exposure group consisted of 20 mice, 10 rats, 10 rabbits, 2 
cats, and 2 goats. After 24 hours, 50% of the mice were dead (10/20); 
after 48 hours, another 8 died, resulting in a casualty rate of 90% in 48 
hours (18/20). All mice showed marked mottling of lungs with congestion, 
edema, and what was described as emphysema. Two rabbits died after 48 
hours (2/20). On examination, one showed large areas of collapse in the 
lung with congestion and edema. The other rabbit showed some edema and 
congestion. The remaining animals survived and were killed at the end of 
the 5 days of exposure. Microscopic examination of the lungs of 37 of the 
animals showed that 22 (59%) had lung changes graded as severe, 15 (41%)
had mild lung changes. Severe lesions were found in the cat, rabbits, 
guinea pigs, and mice. Goats and rats were much less affected. Edema was 
present in 35 of the 37 examined (95%), with severe edema in 12 animals, 
moderate edema in 13, and slight edema in 10. All species showed some 
degree of edema.
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In a subsequent study, Cameron et al [55] exposed a group of animals 
to phosgene at an average concentration of 3.47 mg/cu m (0.86 ppm) for a 
single 5-hour exposure. The animal exposure group consisted of 20 mice, 10 
rats, 10 guinea pigs, 10 rabbits, 2 cats, 2 monkeys, and 2 goats. On the 
morning following exposure, 10% of the rats (1/10) and 60% of the mice 
(12/20) were dead. There were no other casualties, although one cat and 
one monkey were very ill with considerable labored breathing. All 
survivors of the experiment were killed on the morning following exposure. 
All animals were then autopsied and one lung from each animal was fixed in 
formalin for sectioning. Upon examination, 54 out of 56 animals (96.4%) 
showed microscopic evidence of pulmonary involvement which was severe in 29 
animals (39%), mild in 17 (31%), and slight in 16 (30%). The most frequent 
lung change noted was edema.
In another study, Cameron et al [56] reported the results of exposing 
a variety of animals to phosgene at an average concentration of 0.9 mg/cu m 
(0.2 ppm) for 5 hours daily for 5 consecutive days. The experimental group 
consisted of 20 mice, 10 rats, 10 guinea pigs, 10 rabbits, 2 cats, and 2 
goats. No deaths occurred during the exposures. Except for some labored 
breathing noted in the cats and in one goat, the other animals showed 
little evidence of distress. At autopsy, pulmonary lesions were seen in 
67% of the animals. In the opinion of the investigators, the great 
majority of such lesions were slight and of little significance. 
Discounting the more susceptible animals (guinea pigs) and correcting for 
the normal incidence of disease in laboratory animals, the authors 
estimated that probably between 5 and 10% of the animals showed moderately 
severe lesions. Pulmonary edema was noted in 41% of the animals but was
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considered to be slight in most cases. In 6 animals (1 rabbit, 1 mouse, 1 
rat, and 3 guinea pigs), it was extensive. Acute bronchitis was noted in 
22% of the animals and bronchial regeneration in 20%. Their results are 
shown in Table III-3.
In their summary statement, the authors [56] advanced the opinion 
that there is little doubt that repeated exposure at low concentrations 
(0.9 mg/cu m) induces damage to the lungs but that such damage was rarely 
severe. Seemingly in contradiction with this, they also stated that, at 




SEVERITY OF LUNG LESIONS AFTER EXPOSURE TO 0.2 PPM PHOSGENE, 
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Severe lesions 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 4
Mild lesions 0 0 1 3 1 1 6 11
Very slight lesions 0 I 5 6 3 13 28 52
No lesions 2 1 4 0 5 6 18 33
Incidence of pulmonary
edema 0 1 5(1) 7(3) 2(1) 7(1) 22 41
Incidence of severe
bronchitis 0 1 5 5 1 0 12 22
Incidence of
bronchial regeneration 0 0 4 5 1 1 11 20
Incidence of broncho-
pneumonia 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 4
Figures in parentheses under pulmonary edema indicate number of animals 
showing fairly severe edema.
From reference 56
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Correlation of Exposure and Effects
Phosgene is known historically as a respiratory poison used to 
disable large masses of soldiers. It is no longer used as a military 
weapon but has become an important industrial chemical. The focus of 
impairment to the health of those who are exposed to high concentrations of 
the gas has therefore shifted from the military to industry. Epidemiologic 
studies [38, AF Myers, written communication, November 1974] have shown no 
ill effects definitely attributable to phosgene in workers exposed to 
phosgene at an average of 0.125 ppm or less for considerable periods. 
However, the investigations of Levina and Kurando [38] did not mention 
studying the possibility of pulmonary disease, and the Myers communication 
indicated that, most of the time, levels were actually much lower than 
0.125 ppm.
Animal studies, for the most part, have attempted to duplicate the 
war gas or accidental overexposure situation where there is exposure to 
phosgene at high concentrations for relatively short periods. These 
studies, summarized in Table III-4, [29,30,31,39,40,41,42,45,46,48] have 
shown a fairly similar picture, ie, animals dying immediately show severe 
pulmonary epithelial and capillary destruction, and animals surviving show 
variable amounts of bronchiolitis, pneumonitis, bronchial plugging, 
atelectasis, pulmonary consolidation, pneumonia, and emphysema.
The one animal study [56] devoted to long-term, repeated exposure to 
phosgene at low concentrations produced pulmonary edema in 41% of the 
animals. After correcting for the normal incidence of disease in 
laboratory animals, 5-10% of the animals had moderately severe lesions.
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Human exposures to phosgene reported in the literature (summarized in 
Table III-5) consist of many instances of acute overexposure. The work of 
Galdston et al [28,35] is the best substantiated in the American literature 
and gives details of pulmonary function studies in 11 workers with single 
acute or repeated exposures to phosgene at unknown concentrations. 
Unfortunately, other pulmonary irritants were sometimes involved.
Galdston et al [35] gave evidence that repeated exposures to phosgene 
can result in residual pulmonary problems. This paper reports on 5 workers
who were studied in detail, 2 of whom had abnormal chest films. It is
difficult to extrapolate the results found in these workers to what might 
be expected in the general population of workers exposed to phosgene over 
long periods of time.
Levina et al [36] found no pulmonary abnormalities in Soviet workers 
exposed to 1-2 mg/cu m of phosgene for over a 6-month period. Other 
inhalants apparently caused hematologic abnormalities. Unfortunately, no
mention is made of any pulmonary function studies done on these workers.
In summary, there are no truly pertinent data in the scientific 
literature concerned with long-term effects on humans exposed to phosgene 
at low concentrations. Animal data show a 5-10% incidence of severe 
pulmonary problems in animals exposed at 0.2 ppm. Despite Cherkes' [26] 
statement that the dog is the animal most resembling man in terms of 
susceptibility to phosgene, neither Cherkes nor any other investigator has 
offered any concrete data to support this contention. In fact, Winternitz 
et al [50] concluded that, based upon pathologic findings, phosgene lung 
changes were basically similar in all the species studied. Referring to 
investigations of others, Cucinell [57] has stated that, at least in terms
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of lethality, man is about as susceptible as the mouse. But he also 
pointed out that data with which to correlate the toxicity of phosgene in 
man to that in laboratory animals at low concentrations do not exist.
Carcinogenicity, Mutagenicity, and Teratogenicity
Data on other possible effects of toxic chemicals, such as 
carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, or teratogenicity have not been reported for 
phosgene, and there is no analogy on which to postulate such effects on 
long-term, low-level exposure. However, with the likely ability of 
phosgene at high concentrations to cause extensive damage to lung tissue, 
it is conceivable that among survivors of such exposures occasional 
neoplasia might occur as the consequence of regeneration of damaged tissue.
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TABLE III-4









Ivanhoe & Meyers 
[52]
Rabbits, 50-200 ppm 14-25 min Decrease in sym­
pathetic tone
Underhill [31] 
as reported by 
Winternitz et al 
[48]
Dogs, 44-120 ppm 30 min Pulmonary edema, 
pneumonia, 
emphysema, death










death rate from 
74% to 33% by 
previous challenge
Durlacher & Bunting 
[46]
Dogs, 72 ppm 30 min Pulmonary con­
solidation, death
Boyd & Perry [30] Rabbits, 67 ppm 30 min Pulmonary edema
Clay & Rossing 
[39]
Dogs 30 min 
24-40 ppm 1 or 2 exposures 








at rate of 1-3/week
Emphysema










* Animals were gassed to determine effect of pregassing upon a later challenge
58
TABLE III-4 (CONTINUED)






Long & Hatch [29] Rats, 0.5-5 ppm 30 min Decreased pulmonary 
CO uptake
Rinehart & Hatch 
[41]




Gross et al [42] Rats, " I I Chronic pneumonitis
Cameron & Foss 
[54]






Cameron et al 
[55]
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* *
Glass et al Unknown **
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Derrick & Unknown ** "
Johnson [22]______________________________________
* Re-created exposure simulating accident 



























Environmental Concentrations and Engineering Controls
Reports of workroom air levels of phosgene in industrial processes 
utilizing phosgene as a starting material have not been published in the 
United States. In contrast, the formation of phosgene by decomposition of 
chlorinated hydrocarbons and the resulting occupational exposures have been 
extensively studied. In evaluating ventilation plans for the control of 
phosgene in a plant conducting "phosgenation," the Bureau of Engineering 
Safety, Department of Labor and Industry, State of New Jersey, [24] 
reported briefly on workroom air concentrations of phosgene. Air sampling 
in the breathing zones of chemical operators during routine phosgenations 
showed concentrations of phosgene "well within the TLV of 0.1 ppm" at the 
time of this investigation. Details of the sampling and analysis 
procedures were not given, nor were individual sampling results reported. 
Although management had filed plans for canopy hoods over the reactors, the 
ventilation actually consisted of flexible ducts, 4 inches in diameter, to 
each kettle. Engineering controls did not conform to the applicable MCA 
Chemical Safety Data Sheet. [1] Over a 2-year period prior to this 
investigation, at least 6 employees had been acutely exposed to unknown 
concentrations of phosgene. [24] Four of these were not able to return to 
work the day after exposure. One death had occurred and was attributed to 
phosgene inhalation. No details were reported. After the fatality, the 
Bureau of Engineering Safety ordered all phosgene operations stopped 
because of deficient controls. Subsequently, management of the plant 
discontinued the use of phosgene.
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In 1962, Filatova et al [58] investigated health hazards occurring in 
the manufacture of diisocyanates utilizing phosgene as one of the raw 
materials. The authors commented favorably on the isolation of hazardous 
sections of the plant as a method of control. Local exhaust ventilation 
was utilized extensively. Ninety-one workroom air samples were taken and 
analyzed for phosgene by undescribed methods. Units of analytical results 
were not stated but are assumed to be mg/liter. Results showed phosgene 
concentrations ranging from a reported 0 to 0.013 mg/liter (0-3.25 ppm), 
with the most frequently observed concentrations ranging from a reported 0 
to 0.0004 mg/liter. Of the 91 samples, 31 were negative for phosgene. 
However, an unspecified number exceeded the Maximum Permissible 
Concentration (MPC) of 0.5 mg/cu m (0.125 ppm) during such operations as 
cleaning vats or distillation apparatus. Recommendations for control 
included mechanization of manual procedures, provision of independent 
ventilation systems for each floor, limiting the number of hoods for each 
system to 10-12, and providing an intake velocity of at least 1-1.5 
meters/second (197-296 feet/minute) for hoods with movable sash and 
louvers.
In 1966, Filatova [59] reported industrial hygiene evaluations of 
phosgene in the production of isocyanates. A continuous-flow method was 
used, involving the use of remote control equipment and the mechanization 
of unspecified operations, and so-called hermetization which was assumed to 
mean enclosure or sealing of equipment, particularly that operating under 
pressure. Under these conditions, 91% of air samples were below maximum 
permissible concentrations for phosgene. Filatova did not further reporf 
the results of air sampling.
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Also in 1966, Levina et al [36] reported on industrial hygiene 
problems and worker health in monuron production. Monuron was defined as 
3-(p-chlorophenyl)-l,1-dimethylurea and was used as an agricultural 
pesticide. Monuron was produced by the interaction of 
parachlorophenylisocyanate and dimethylamine. Synthesis of the isocyanate 
involved the use of phosgene. The authors criticized the plant layout 
because units using materials of high toxicity (eg, phosgene) were located 
throughout the general work area rather than being isolated. Local exhaust 
ventilation placed at sources of contaminant escape, in addition to general 
ventilation, provided some control. Makeup air inlets were considered by 
the authors [36] to be wrongly placed. Workroom air samples analyzed for 
phosgene (503 samples) showed concentrations commonly ranging from 1.0 to
2.0 mg/cu m (0.25-0.5 ppm). The maximum permissible concentration in 
Russia at that time was 0.5 mg/cu m (0.125 ppm). Most phosgene was 
released during disassembly and repair of pumps, which often became 
clogged. This operation, as well as repair of other phosgene equipment, 
the transmission of phosgene under pressure, and the taking of samples for 
quality control were carried out by workers wearing gas masks. Released 
phosgene was said to be neutralized with ammonia. Control recommendations 
included replacement of equipment with improved hermetically sealed pumps 
and revamping of the makeup air system to provide uniform air supply at low 
velocities. Mechanization of systems, relocation in areas removed from the 
general workrooms, and use of remote controls were also recommended.
In 1967, Levina and Kurando [38] described exposures to phosgene and 
other chemicals in the manufacture of isopropyl phenylcarbamate, used as a 
herbicide. Totally enclosed equipment kept under reduced pressure
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prevented the escape of toxic chemicals to a large degree. Equipment and 
connections were made of corrosion-resistant materials, with special 
attention to flanges and valves. Atmospheric pollution was prevented by 
trapping gases and returning them to process. However, where manual labor 
was substituted for mechanization or total enclosure, some gas escape was 
possible. Hazardous processes were separated, and ventilation was reported 
to be correctly designed and located. Makeup air was supplied. Phosgene 
was detected in 30% of all air samples taken; of the samples where phosgene 
was detected, the usual concentration was 0.5 mg/cu m (0.125 ppm), the 
maximum permissible concentration. Methods of sampling and analysis were 
not described. During operations such as quality control sampling, 
pressure transfer of phosgene, and pump repair, the concentration of 
phosgene in the workroom air was 1.0 mg/cu m (0.25 ppm). However, these 
concentrations were described as transient, because the premises were 
cleared by release of ammonia whenever the odor of phosgene became 
discernible. Gas masks were worn by personnel engaged in these tasks. 
Recommendations for further control included improved sealing of equipment, 
elimination of manual operations by maximum automation, use of protective 
clothing, and good personal hygiene.
Rispoli [60] reported 1 and 5 ppm phosgene in a plastics- 
manufacturing plant. No details of sampling or analysis were given, but 
ventilation was described as insufficient.
Reporting on 109 cases of phosgene inhalation over a 12-year period, 
Thiess and Goldmann [19] selected the 3 most severe cases for more detailed 
discussion. None of the exposures reported were long-term inhalation of 
low concentrations but were acute accidental exposures at relatively high
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concentrations. No determinations of workroom air concentrations were 
reported, but in 2 of the severe cases some assumptions and calculations 
were made which might have defined the exposure level involved.
One case described by Thiess and Goldmann [19] involved a worker 
removing brick lining, presumably saturated with phosgene, from a reaction 
vessel. The chemical process for which the reactor was constructed was the 
chlorination of aluminum oxide in the presence of carbon monoxide for the 
production of aluminum chloride. Phosgene was a byproduct of this 
reaction. Contrary to instructions, the brick lining was removed with a 
jackhammer from the inside of the furnace and without respiratory
protection. Instructions had been given to remove the brick from the
outside of the vessel and to wear respiratory protection. The exposure
lasted about 30 minutes, during which the worker was presumed to have
inhaled dust particles with adsorbed phosgene. Again, assumptions and 
calculations based on porosity measurements of the brick indicated that a
total volume of 2.5 liters was available for absorption of gas by the
lining material. This exposure terminated fatally. There is at least a 
suggestion that the effect of phosgene was enhanced because of its 
association with particulate matter, but this was not proved.
Unpublished data show that air concentrations of phosgene were
generally low in a chemical manufacturing unit where phosgene was used as a
raw material. (AF Myers, written communication, November 1974) Air samplers 
placed on operators showed concentrations on analysis ranging from 
nondetected to 0.08 mg/cu m. Samples taken in fixed locations ranged from 
nondetected to 0.52 mg/cu m. During the 2-month period of fixed location 
sampling, there were 5 instances of off-scale measurements (greater than
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0.55 mg/cu m) reportedly due to leaks. In summary, the workroom air 
measurements of phosgene in a manufacturing unit showed that, about 25% of 
the time, operators were exposed to very low but measurable concentrations 
of phosgene. Sampling procedures used did not determine individual peaks. 
Details of controls or of fixed sampling locations were not given. The 
plant surveyed was reportedly old and built with out-of-date technology.
The decomposition of chlorinated hydrocarbons by means of heat or 
ultraviolet radiation with the formation of phosgene has been blamed for a 
number of incidents involving respiratory tract damage in humans. 
[5,6,7,21,61,62,63,64, written communication from DR Parker, Oregon State 
Board of Health, November 1964] This has stimulated a great deal of 
investigation of the decomposition products formed when chlorinated 
hydrocarbons are exposed to ultraviolet radiation and heat, such as open 
flames and burning cigarettes. The following exemplify these 
investigations.
In 1933, the Underwriters Laboratories [65] reported the results of 
decomposition of a number of chlorinated hydrocarbons (ie, chloroform, 
carbon tetrachloride, a number of halocarbon compounds, dichloroethylene, 
methylene chloride, and others) exposed to gas flames, hot electric range 
units, oil fires, wood fires, and hot metal surfaces. The temperatures of 
these heat sources were not specified. Decomposition products were 
analyzed for hydrogen chloride, phosgene, chlorine, and others. The 
analytical method for phosgene involved the reaction of phosgene with 
aniline to form diphenylurea. The influence of relative humidity and 
initial concentration of chlorinated hydrocarbon was studied. The major 
decomposition product found was hydrogen chloride measured as total acids,
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which ranged from nondetected to 8.86 volume percent, followed by phosgene 
with concentrations ranging from a reported zero to 0.143 volume percent. 
Chlorine was found in the concentration range of a reported zero to 0.164 
volume percent.
In 1936, Yant et al [66] found significant quantities of phosgene in 
the decomposition products of carbon tetrachloride exposed to excelsior 
fires and heated steel surfaces. The analytical method used was based on 
the formation of diphenylurea which was found by Yant et al [66] and the 
Underwriters Laboratories [65] to be essentially free from interference by 
hydrogen chloride and chlorine. More recent research has shown that 
hydrogen chloride and chlorine do significantly interfere with the
diphenylurea analytical method. [67]
Elkins and Levine [68] investigated the decomposition of halogenated 
hydrocarbons when passed through burning cigarettes and cigars. Analytical 
methods used were for total chloride and therefore not specific for
phosgene. However, based on the small amounts of total chloride found in
the samples, the authors [68] concluded that phosgene was not a hazard when 
cigars or cigarettes were smoked in the presence of chlorinated hydrocarbon 
vapor.
In 1955, Little, [20] using the p-dimethylaminobenzaldehyde and
diphenylamine method, confirmed the conclusions of Elkins and Levine [68] 
that phosgene was not formed in sufficient quantities by smoking to present 
a hazard. He also found that various chlorinated hydrocarbons in contact 
with a heated silica tube did not produce significant quantities of 
phosgene below 400 C. Even in atmospheres containing small amounts of 
phosgene, finding no detectable phosgene in effluent gas from cigarettes
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led to the conclusion that, if any phosgene were formed, it was 
subsequently decomposed when passed through the combustion zone of the 
cigarette. It was also hypothesized that the phosgene was absorbed by the 
tar fraction of the tobacco combustion product.
Crummett and Stenger [69] found that, in contact with heated metals,
methyl chloroform (1,1,1-trichloroethane) produced relatively small amounts 
of phosgene, but much more hydrogen chloride than did carbon tetrachloride.
Dahlberg, [70,71] Dahlberg et al, [72] and Dahlberg and Myrin [73] 
extensively investigated the interaction of ultraviolet radiation with 
chlorinated hydrocarbons. These studies indicated that relatively lower 
amounts of phosgene were formed compared to the quantities of
dichloroacetyl chloride formed simultaneously. Although there have been no 
environmental limits recommended for dichloroacetyl chloride, it seems 
likely that it would be a strong irritant to skin and eyes. Actual 
measurements of decomposition products of trichloroethylene in welding 
shops confirmed their experimentally derived conclusions. In 10 welding 
shops under varying conditions of ventilation and trichloroethylene
concentration, phosgene was found in concentrations ranging from 0.003 to
3.0 ppm, while dichloroacetyl chloride concentrations ranged from less than 
0.01 to 13.0 ppm.
In a more recent investigation, Andersson et al [74] experimentally 
studied phosgene formation from perchloroethylene (PCE) during welding. 
Welding was carried out in a closed chamber, into which varying 
concentrations of PCE had been introduced by evaporation of the solvent in 
front of a fan. Analysis for both perchloroethylene and phosgene were done 
by gas chromatograph with an electron-capture detector. The authors
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concluded that welding in air containing PCE below its threshold limit 
value of 100 ppm was more hazardous than welding in air containing 
trichloroethylene or methy1-chloroform because of the much faster formation 
of phosgene from PCE. Levels of perchloroethylene ranged from 2.1 to 30 
ppm, while phosgene formed after 5 or 10 seconds ranged from 0.2 to 1.7 
ppm.
Noweir et al [75] found that, at very high temperatures, phosgene 
itself decomposes, perhaps accounting for concentrations lower than 
expected. However, phosgene decomposition was greatly reduced in the 
presence of carbon tetrachloride, indicating that, at least for this 
chlorinated hydrocarbon, phosgene formed by its decomposition should be 
relatively stable as long as some carbon tetrachloride remained.
A number of occupational exposures to decomposition products of 
chlorinated hydrocarbons have been reported. In 1947, Hill [64] briefly 
reported an investigation of complaints of workers exposed to fumes arising 
from a carbon arc-welding operation. A presumably adequate exhaust 
ventilation system existed, but the fumes causing the complaints were 
sometimes strong enough to be detected at some distance from the arc. The 
workers had not complained prior to the relocation of the operation to a 
room near a trichloroethylene degreaser. Qualitative tests indicated the 
presence of phosgene presumably caused by breakdown of trichloroethylene 
vapor by the ultraviolet radiation of the arc. It was recommended that the 
degreaser be replaced with alkaline wash equipment and that the use of 
chlorinated hydrocarbons in the welding room be prohibited.
Spolyar et al [5] investigated the circumstances causing the death of 
an employee who had installed a trichloroethylene degreaser and had
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operated it without the condensing coils functioning. A strong odor of 
solvent was present in the room when the employee's body was discovered. 
An investigation by the authors [5] took place 3 weeks later, disclosing 
the following:
(1) Trichloroethylene had been used in a degreaser designed for 
higher-boiling perchloroethylene, causing excessive loss of solvent.
(2) A fuel-oil-buming space heater was located in the degreaser 
room, and all windows and doors had been closed on the day of the accident.
(3) Under test conditions, 225-450 ppm trichloroethylene were 
found near the degreasing tank.
The trichloroethylene vapor passing through the firebox of the space 
heater could be decomposed with the possible formation of phosgene. A re­
creation of the situation at the time of the accident, described in Effects 
on Humans, was undertaken, during which it was noted that one of the 
solvent heaters in the degreaser became red-hot. Samples taken at that 
time in the approximate location of an operator's breathing zone showed 
much higher levels of trichloroethylene and 15 ppm phosgene. The authors 
[5] suggested that the decomposition of the trichloroethylene was caused by 
the degreaser heating element rather than by the space heater, although a 
back pressure in the smoke pipe of the latter could occur under adverse 
weather conditions because of the configuration of the stack.
Although some effects due to trichloroethylene were apparent, the 
authors concluded that the cause of death was consistent with phosgene 
exposure.
In 1951, Wulfert [62] reported the results of an investigation of the 
manufacturing of hard metal drills (presumably with tungsten carbide drill
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inserts). Drills were washed in trichloroethylene after which the solvent 
was blown off with compressed air into the shop atmosphere prior to 
brazing. Brazing was completed with an induction coil or gas brazing, 
depending on the size of the drill. Results of workroom air sampling for 
phosgene were reported only as exceeding 1 ppm. The author [62] concluded 
that local exhaust ventilation was required.
An investigation of worker complaints was reported by Challen et al 
[76] in 1958. The workers involved were employed in a welding shop 
fabricating aluminum milk chums. Upper respiratory symptoms were thought 
to have been caused by phosgene from decomposition of trichloroethylene 
originating from a tank of the solvent located in an adjacent bay. Air 
samples were taken and analyzed for trichloroethylene, ozone, and phosgene. 
All phosgene samples contained less than 0.1 ppm, although the 
trichloroethylene concentrations ranged from a reported 0.0 to 238 ppm and 
the ozone concentrations ranged from 0.9 to 1.7 ppm. The authors [76] 
concluded that ozone rather than phosgene was the source of the complaints. 
Exhaust ventilation was installed in the degreasing shop and at the welding 
positions and operating procedures to prevent solvent drag-out were 
implemented, resulting in improved working conditions.
In a November 1964 letter from DR Parker to J Boyer, the Oregon State 
Board of Health reported finding a phosgene concentration in air of 4.86
mg/cu m (1.2 ppm) in the vicinity of welders who had complained of noxious
odors. Two other samples indicated no phosgene. Decomposition of 
perchloroethylene vapor from a recently installed degreaser was considered 
to be the source of the phosgene. The perchloroethylene concentration on
the day of the high phosgene sample was as much as 37 ppm. Remedial
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recommendations included relocation and isolation of the degreaser from the 
welding area. A ventilated booth was suggested for this purpose.
In summary, the earlier experimental studies [65,66] clearly indicate 
phosgene produced by decomposition of chlorinated hydrocarbons could 
present a hazard; there are cases that clearly show phosgene present in 
sufficient quantity to be a health hazard. [5,65,66] It should be noted 
that the various methods of heating, different temperatures used when 
producing the chlorinated hydrocarbon decomposition products, and the 
different analytical methods probably accounted for much of the variation 
from study to study.
Sampling and Analytical Methods
Detection methods for phosgene prior to the mid-1950's met minimal 
demands for sensitivity and detection limits. Soon after this, however, 
large-scale industrial use of the gas in polymer manufacturing processes 
prompted increased emphasis on potential industrial hygiene problems 
associated with its use. Linch et al [77] reviewed most of the analytical 
methods for phosgene used prior to 1965 and classified them into (1) 
physical measurement, (2) determination of chloride ion after hydrolysis,
(3) iodometric procedures, (4) gravimetric procedures, and (5) colorimetric 
procedures.
Physical measurements were based on the olfactory or taste response 
imparted to tobacco smoke immediately after phosgene inhalation and was 
considered to be a very sensitive indicator [77] of the gas, although it 
suffered from the obvious disadvantage of depending on the exposed worker 
to determine his exposure.
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A method of analysis based upon chloride present after hydrolysis was 
reported [77,78] to depend on aqueous decomposition of phosgene in dilute 
alkali. Residual base was titrated or the chloride present was determined 
by the Volhard or the bichromate method; the hydrogen chloride gas produced 
upon hydrolysis could also be absorbed in ammoniacal silver nitrate and the 
resultant silver chloride determined gravimetrically. [79,80] However,
these procedures were susceptible to physiologically inert, acid-reacting, 
or chloride-producing components occurring simultaneously with the 
phosgene. [77]
Iodometric procedures in anhydrous acetone with thiosulfate titration 
suffered from inherent field limitations due to the anhydrous conditions 
necessary and evaporation of the volatile solvent. [77]
Gravimetric procedures included (1) a method based on insoluble 
diphenylurea derived from phosgene and aniline, but which was sensitive to 
halogen interferences [80] and limited to a lower detection threshold of 
about 10 ppm [77]; and (2) a modified Kjeldahl nitrogen analysis of the 
diphenylurea which offered little improvement.[77]
Review of colorimetric analytical methods [81,82,83,84] that were 
developed indicated that the most sensitive and specific detector was 4- 
(4'-nitrobenzyl)pyridine (NBP) plus N-benzylaniline although it did not 
readily lend itself to a liquid reagent system. Later investigators [85] 
developed a method using diethylphthalate as an absorber with NBP and N- 
benzylaniline and easily determined phosgene at concentrations less than 
0.1 ppm in air. Spot tests have been described [77,79,81] for phosgene 
which generally rely on colored complex formation between heavy metals and 
diphenylcarbazones.
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Various detector papers and treated crayons have been described for 
determination of phosgene [86,87,88,89] with the most sensitive prepared 
from a benzene solution of 2% 4-(4*-nitrobenzyl)pyridine, 5% N-
phenylbenzylamine, and a chalk matrix which was then dried and pressed into 
crayons and was capable of detecting 8 ppb phosgene in air after a 1-minute 
exposure. All of the crayon and detector paper methods suffer sensitivity 
loss from storage; color change sensitivity to oxygen, chlorine, hydrogen 
chloride, and daylight; and the inherent disadvantage of reliance on visual 
detection of small color differences. [88, 89]
Direct reading, colorimetric detector tubes are available for the 
measurement of phosgene. [1,2,90,91,92] They offer a quick and easy method 
of determining approximate quantities in the reported range of 0-50 ppm and 
of indicating the need for initiation of emergency procedures or for 
further, more accurate evaluation. Today, most detector tubes are of the 
"length of stain" type. A fixed volume of air is drawn through a glass 
tube containing a solid sorbent which reacts with phosgene. A color stain 
is produced which varies in length with the concentration measured. The 
length of stain is compared with a calibration chart provided by the 
manufacturer. Accuracy expected is only + 30%.
An ultraviolet technique was developed [93] which uses the absorption 
at 254.5 nm of 1,3-diphenylurea formed when phosgene reacts with aniline- 
saturated water. A later refinement of the technique [67] was made using 
an extraction step with a 1:1 solution of n-hexane and 1-pentanol. The 
latter method allowed detection of 0.01 ppm phosgene in air with a 30-liter 
air sample. Collection efficiency was only about 90%.
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A micromanometric method was described [94] which utilized 
measurement of gaseous reaction products resulting from hydrolysis of 
phosgene, but details as to sensitivity and specificity were lacking.
Gas chromatographic techniques provide the most specific and 
sensitive detection methods for phosgene. A silica gel column at 56.5 C 
with a hot wire detector was first used to detect phosgene in pyrolysis 
products on a semiquantitative basis. [95] The development of the electron 
capture detector for the gas chromatograph provided a high degree of 
specificity for phosgene. This detector was first tried [96] in 
conjunction with a dodecylphthalate column at 50 C with resultant 2% 
standard deviation and detection down to 1 ppb. The authors suggested that 
this method can possibly be used as the basis for an automatic, continuous 
monitoring system. A later refinement [97] used a column of "20% silicon 
oil DC 200" (probably silicone DC 200) on Chromosorb W at 25 C for 
detection from below 1 ppb to 0.1 ppm phosgene. Jeltes et al [98] 
confirmed detection below 0.005 ppm but pointed out inherent difficulties 
due to hydrolysis by trace amounts of moisture, leakage of transfer 
syringes, and problems in transporation and storage of the air samples. 
Basu et al [99] presented operational parameters, retention times, and 
response factors for gas mixtures including phosgene using a 3-column, 3- 
detector (thermal conductivity) gas chromatographic system with a resultant 
reproducibility represented by a ±1% standard deviation.
Although the gas chromatographic methods display excellent analytical 
capabilities, field use is hampered by the lack of an adequate personal 
sampling method. Recent investigations by Barrett et al [100] of a number 
of solid sorbents indicated that phosgene can be efficiently collected with
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activated carbon, alumina, and porous glass, but no satisfactory desorption 
technique was found.
Methods have been reported for automatic or continuous monitoring of 
phosgene in air. [77,90,96,101,102,103, RW Miller, written communication, 
May 1975] The instrumentation requirements make the methods impractical 
for field use. In-plant applications may be possible but the lower limit 
of detection may be questionable.
One continuous-sensing instrument which has been found to be 
generally reliable below 0.1 ppm of phosgene is the Army's M8 portable 
alarm device for toxic chemical agents. It uses an electrochemical cell as 
the sensing unit and is designed to give a warning signal when the 
concentration of phosgene exceeds a certain value. The instrument is 
therefore not ideally suited for measurement of varying concentrations, but 
may well have some application as a monitoring or safety device. The 
device has been tested at concentrations of 0.074 ppm, 0.185 ppm, 0.443 
ppm, and 0.625 ppm. The response was found to be linear over this range. 
[ 100]
The method of choice for detection of phosgene in the workroom air 
should provide for a minimum limit of detection of less than 0.05 ppm, 
reasonable freedom from interference from commonly expected chemicals (see 
Appendix II) and should permit relatively easy sample collection. The 
method which best meets these requirements is described in an Analytical 
Guide by the American Industrial Hygiene Association [104] and is an 
improved nitrobenzylpyridine colorimetric method. It involves drawing air 
through a midget impinger containing 10 ml of a solution of 0.25% 4—(4'—
nitrobenzyl)pyridine and 0.5% N-phenylbenzylamine in diethylphthalate and
76
measurement of the subsequent color development at 475 nm. Sampling
efficiency is at least 99%, [85,104] and the range 0.05-1.0 ppm can be
measured if a 25-minute sample at 1 liter/min is collected in 10 ml of
reagent. No statistically significant interferences were observed [85,104] 
from carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, perchloroethylene,
trichloroethylene, dichlorodifluoromethane, chlorine, hydrogen chloride, or 
chlorine dioxide. Color stability is good (only 10-15% loss in color
density after 8 hours), sampling and analysis equipment needed is simple 
and readily available, and operator expertise required is minimal.
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V. DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD
Basis for Previous Standards
In 1940, Bowditch et al [105] listed a maximum concentration of 1 ppm 
(4 mg/cu m) phosgene which was in effect in Massachusetts as a guide to 
manufacturers interested in maintaining satisfactory working conditions. 
In 1945, Cook [106] compiled a list of maximum allowable concentrations 
(MAC) of industrial atmospheric contaminants. Cook noted that 1 ppm (4 
mg/cu m) was the MAC value for exposure to phosgene in the workroom air 
adopted by California, Connecticut, New York, Oregon, Utah, and the US 
Public Health Service. Cook referred to Fieldner et al [107] and Flury and 
Zernik [108] as a basis for the accepted value of 1 ppm (4 mg/cu m). 
Fieldner et al [107] indicated that 3 ppm of phosgene in air was irritating 
to the throat. Flury and Zernik [108] indicated that 1 ppm was the highest 
tolerable amount in man, with 1.25-2.5 ppm termed as dangerous to life if 
the exposure was prolonged.
In 1947, Bloomfield [109] reviewed the efforts of a committee within 
the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists to develop an 
MAC which could be adopted by all the states. Bloomfield [109] cited 
unanimous agreement on a phosgene MAC value of 1 ppm (4 mg/cu m) among 23 
respondents.
In 1947, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists [110] adopted an MAC value for phosgene of 1 ppm (4 mg/cu m). 
It was not stated if this MAC was intended as a ceiling value or as a TWA 
concentration. The April 1948 meeting of this same organization [111] 
adopted 1 ppm as a recommended limit and changed the name to Threshold 
Limit Values (TLV's).
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The TLV of 1 ppm was considered "sufficiently low to cause no more 
than minimal effects" by the ACGIH according to the 1962 Documentation of 
the Threshold Limit Values. [112] The Documentation [112] cited Fieldner 
et al [107] and Henderson and Haggard [113] to explain its selection of a 
TLV of 1 ppm (4 mg/cu m) for phosgene. Fieldner et al [107] reported that 
the Chemical Warfare Service at the American University Experiment Station, 
Washington, DC, considered 1 ppm of phosgene (4 mg/cu m) the maximal 
concentration safe for prolonged exposure. Henderson and Haggard, [113] in 
their review on phosgene, referred to Fieldner et al [107] and listed 1 ppm 
(4 mg/cu m) or less as a maximum concentration allowable for prolonged 
exposure. Both sources listed 3 ppm as the concentration at which throat 
irritation first occurs. The Documentation did not quote any other 
experimental or occupational data to support its recommended TLV.
A change to 0.1 ppm (0.4 mg/cu m) was proposed by the ACGIH in 1964 
[114] and 1965 [115] and adopted in 1966. [116] A TLV of 0.1 ppm (0.4 
mg/cu m) was supported in the 1966 Documentation [117] because of the 
"seriousness of the response at the experienced levels of phosgene and by 
analogy with edemagenic agents of similar activity." The Documentation 
cited Gross et al [42] who wrote that phosgene, which could produce fatal 
pulmonary edema or acute chemical pneumonia at a high concentration, could 
also produce chronic pneumonitis at a low concentration. Gross et al 
suggested that the chronic pneumonitis is reversible even though residual 
pneumonitis could be found three months later. [42] The alveolar 
epithelium in rats can become irritated after a single 120-minute phosgene 
exposure at 0.5 ppm. [42] Studies by Box and Cullumbine [40] indicated that 
preliminary nonlethal doses of phosgene produced a transitory effect of
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increasing tolerance to the gas. It was necessary to damage the lungs of 
rats and mice to produce this effect. Stokinger et al [118] reported 
chronic lung injury of small animals after repeated exposure to ozone. 
They stated that this is a separate process from the development of 
tolerance to subsequent acute exposure. In reviewing Stokinger’s article, 
[118] the Documentation [117] stated that "the development of tolerance, 
however, is believed to be the triggering mechanism of chronic, 
irreversible pulmonary changes of emphysema and fibrosis from prolonged 
daily exposure at concentrations that produce no ostensible acute 
response." The Documentation [117] assumed that both ozone and phosgene 
caused pulmonary edema.
The 1971 Documentation [119] was the same as the 1966 Documentation 
[117] with a few minor style changes and one additional sentence listing a 
recommendation for the USSR (1959) of 0.1 ppm and mentioning Elkins, [120] 
who recommended 0.5 ppm. There was no discussion of the additional 
recommendations nor were any new references cited in the bibliography. In 
1974, it was recommended [121] that the TLV of 0.1 ppm be changed to a 
ceiling concentration of 0.05 ppm (0.2 mg/cu m). Documentation for this 
change was published in the 1974 ACGIH Transactions [122] and refers to 
Stokinger's article on ozone toxicity studies [118] which indicated that 
there were chronic, irreversible pulmonary changes from prolonged daily 
exposure even though there was no acute response. None of the references 
cited specifically supported the ceiling limit of 0.05 ppm (0.2 mg/cu m) 
which was recommended because of the irritating effect of phosgene on the 
respiratory tract.
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In 1971, Pennsylvania [123] adopted an environmental limit of 0.1 ppm 
(0.4 mg/cu m) for phosgene. It was a maximum average atmospheric 
concentration for an 8-hour day. A short-term maximum average exposure 
limit of 1 ppm (4 mg/cu m) for 5 minutes was established. Henderson and 
Haggard, [124] Imperial Chemical Industry, and Patty [125] were cited as 
the basis for the short-term limit in the Pennsylvania documentation. [126]
Phosgene is suspected to be formed by the decomposition of 
fluorochlorocarbons in submarine atmospheres. Webb [127] listed a maximum 
limit of 0.1 ppm (0.4 mg/cu m) exposure for a 90-day dive. He reported 
that an interim limit of 1 ppm (4 mg/cu m) for a 1-hour exposure was 
recommended by the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. The limit was for 
a single exposure and not a permissible limit for repeated short-term 
exposures.
A safe concentration zone of 0.4-0.5 mg/cu m (0.1 ppm to 0.125 ppm) 
was recommended for international adoption in 1968 by the Joint ILO/WHO 
Committee on Occupational Health. [128] The Joint ILO/WHO Committee [129] 
prepared a survey of legislation and practices concerning permissible 
limits and listed MAC values for the following foreign countries:
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TABLE V-l










United Arab Republic 4 1
Yugoslavia 0.4 0.1
* for short single exposure 
From reference 129
The USSR [37] cited a permissible phosgene concentration of 0.5 mg/cu
m (0.125 ppm) as established by the Main State Health Inspector of the USSR
on January 10, 1959, No 279-59. If workers are in an industrial area for a
brief, unspecified period, deviations are permitted with the authorization
of the USSR State Health Inspectorate.
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Great Britain, [130] Japan, [131] and the Federal Republic of Germany 
[132] based their environmental limits for phosgene of 0.1 ppm (0.4 mg/cu 
m) on the ACGIH value. These environmental limits were TWA concentrations 
for a normal working day.
The present federal standard (29 CFR 1910.1000) for phosgene is an 8- 
hour TWA concentration of 0.1 ppm (0.4 mg/cu m) based on the 1968 ACGIH 
recommendation.
Basis for the Recommended Environmental Standard
At the present time, there are no definitive data in the scientific 
literature concerned with long-term effects of phosgene on humans exposed 
at low concentrations. Human exposure to phosgene reported in the 
literature (see Table III-5), for the most part, consists of instances of 
acute overexposure, often involving a mixture of pulmonary irritants. 
Those epidemiologic studies [36, AF Myers, written communication, November 
1974] involving exposures at low levels of phosgene suffer from a number of 
defects, including exposures to multiple irritants and limited analytical 
or medical data. In spite of the weaknesses noted, these studies are at 
least suggestive that the present federal standard is safe for long-term 
exposures. Therefore, until more conclusive evidence is developed, NIOSH 
recommends that the present federal standard of 0.1 ppm as a TWA 
concentration be maintained.
In addition, since phosgene is an acute-acting, irritant gas, it is 
essential to control the short-term excursions above this average. Animal 
experiments have demonstrated a threshold for the development of pulmonary 
lesions after short-term exposure to phosgene. Gross et al [42] reported
83
that exposure of rats to phosgene at a concentration of 3 ppm for 5 minutes 
resulted in slight to moderate chronic pneumonitis, while rats exposed at
1.3-1.5 ppm for 10 minutes showed no evidence of recognizable pulmonary 
lesions. Similarly, rat experiments conducted by Rinehart and Hatch [41] 
revealed that exposures to phosgene at a concentration of 1.5 ppm for 20 
minutes or less did not result in any evidence of functional respiratory
impairment as measured by carbon monoxide or ether uptake. In both
studies, [41,42] deleterious effects were found at the lowest concentration 
used, 0.5 ppm, when duration of exposure was 120 minutes or greater.
Although no data are available to substantiate the pulmonary effects of
brief exposures to phosgene at low concentrations in humans, these studies 
suggest that a single exposure of 10-15 minutes' duration at concentrations 
of or below 1.5 ppm are likely to be safe. It is felt, however, that 
imposing further limitations on the degree of excursion permitted during a 
10-hour workday will provide an additional margin of safety to ensure 
protection of the worker from the consequences of brief exposures to 
concentrations of phosgene above the recommended TWA limit. NIOSH is 
therefore proposing a ceiling limit of 0.2 ppm for any 15-minute period.
In view of the development of pulmonary edema and evidence of chronic 
lung changes as a result of exposure to phosgene, medical monitoring, 
including chest X-rays and pulmonary function tests, is required for the 
protection of the worker.
Professional judgment indicates that local contact with liquid 
phosgene is likely to cause severe tissue damage which could in part be due 
to the low temperature of liquid phosgene. Thus skin and eye protection, 
in addition to respiratory protection, is recommended for those likely to 
be in contact with liquid phosgene.
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It is recognized that many workers are exposed to phosgene at 
concentrations considerably below the recommended occupational limits. 
Under these conditions, it should not be necessary to comply with many of 
the provisions of this recommended standard. However, concern for worker 
health requires that protective measures be instituted below the 
enforceable limits to ensure that exposures do not exceed the standard. 
For this reason, "occupational exposure to phosgene" has been defined as 
exposure above half the recommended TWA, thereby delineating those work 
situations which do not require the installation of unnecessary controls 
and the expenditure of health resources for provisions such as 
environmental and medical monitoring and associated recordkeeping.
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VI. WORK PRACTICES
Strict adherence to stringent and detailed work practices is required 
if hazardous occupational exposures to phosgene are to be prevented. The 
properties of phosgene which determine to a large extent the nature of 
necessary work practices are: (a) the delayed and insidious onset of
symptoms due to exposure to low concentrations; (b) an odor threshold 
which cannot be relied upon to provide an adequate warning; and (c) its 
irritant effects on tissue, especially the lungs. However, precautions 
required in the handling and usage of phosgene have much in common with 
those required for other irritating gases. The work practices specified in 
this document are derived in large part from phosgene manufacturers' 
literature [10,133] and the Manufacturing Chemists' Association Chemical 
Safety Data Sheet SD-95. [1] In addition, work practices prescribed for 
other irritating gases have been adapted for phosgene wherever pertinent 
(eg, those published in the Chlorine Manual [134]).
Warning Properties
The American Industrial Hygiene Association [90] stated that the 
irritant properties of phosgene were insufficient to give warning of 
hazardous concentrations, and that olfactory fatigue caused personnel 
working with phosgene to lose their ability to detect low concentrations by 
smell. Supporting data for these statements were not reported.
The Manufacturing Chemists' Association [1] reported that the odor of 
phosgene can be recognized by some persons at 0.5 ppm, but that the sense 
of smell is conditioned by the gas so that the odor can only be detected
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briefly at the time of initial exposure. No substantiating data for these 
statements were cited, but many materials do have the ability to cause odor 
fatigue.
Leonardos et al [18] investigated the odor thresholds of 53 
chemicals. They defined the odor threshold as the first concentration at 
which all members of a trained panel could recognize the odor of a 
chemical. Their tests indicated an odor threshold for phosgene of 1.0 ppm. 
The odor was described as being "hay-like."
In 1938, Wells et al [17] determined threshold odor detection of 
phosgene in a number of volunteers. Test concentrations were established 
with a proportioning instrument known as an osmoscope. Three tests run on 
56 subjects showed that all subjects detected the odor of phosgene at or 
below 37.5 mg/cu m (9.4 ppm), 51.8% detected the odor of phosgene at or 
below 6.1 mg/cu m (1.5 ppm), and that none detected the odor below 1.8 
mg/cu m (0.45 ppm).
Macy, [135] summarizing the properties and the physiological action 
of phosgene, stated that the threshold of odor for phosgene was 4.4 mg/cu m 
(1.1 ppm). Substantiating data were not included in this report.
It is concluded that the odor of phosgene, when detected, indicates 
the need for immediate corrective action. However, an absence of odor 
cannot be relied upon to indicate that exposure does not exist.
Emergencies
Personnel who have escaped from an exposure to phosgene and have 
inhaled dangerous quantities should be kept warm but not overheated. If 
possible, they should not be allowed to walk from the scene of overexposure
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but should be carried. Exercise may intensify the effects of phosgene, but 
this has not been definitely established. In any case, physical activity 
should be limited to keep oxygen requirements at a minimum. Every effort 
must be made to treat the individual after overexposure occurs and to 
observe him for the onset of delayed symptoms. All facilities handling 
phosgene should have compressed, breathing-grade oxygen available. 
[1,2 , 10, 11]
Phosgene presents no fire or explosion hazard, but high temperatures 
may rupture containers because of increased hydrostatic pressure. [2] In 
case of fire, phosgene containers should be removed to a safe place or 
cooled with water if phosgene is not escaping. [1]
Spills are best controlled with solutions of caustic soda or with 
ammonia. It has been reported [1] that some manufacturers store one ton of 
ammonia for each ton of stored phosgene for the purpose of neutralizing 
liquid spills.
Control of Airborne Phosgene
Phosgene should be used only in completely closed systems. In 
addition, local exhaust and general ventilation can be effective for 
control at points of potential escape. [1,2,10,38,58,59,90] Discharges of 
ventilation systems or of leaking containers may be passed through 
scrubbers utilizing caustic soda, ammonia, or steam to prevent phosgene 
from reaching the outdoor atmosphere. [1,2,90,133]
The possibility of phosgene formation must be considered when 
installing and operating vapor degreasers containing chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, since under poor operating conditions, these are potential
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sources of phosgene. [5,74,136] They should be controlled to prevent 
exposure of operators to both solvent vapors and phosgene.
During maintenance operations on equipment in which phosgene has been 
present, there is a potential hazard of exposure to phosgene which is 
entrapped in the equipment or adsorbed on surfaces or in materials. 
Respiratory protection should be supplied to maintenance personnel working 
on equipment that has carried phosgene, unless it can be established that 
no phosgene is present.
Respiratory Protection
Neither chemical cartridge respirators nor half-face masks are 
recommended for protection against phosgene. [137] Canister-type gas masks 
are recommended only for rapid escape from a contaminated area because of 
the following limitations:
(1) Their useful life is unpredictable because of a number of 
variables such as breathing rate, ambient humidity, and contaminant 
concentration. [137]
(2) They cannot be used in atmospheres deficient in oxygen or 
containing phosgene in concentrations over 2.0% by volume. [137] Therefore, 
they are not suitable for controlling emergency exposures where the 
concentration of phosgene and the oxygen content of the air are unknown. 
[1]
(3) Users of gas masks have depended on the detection of an odor 
of the atmospheric contaminant to warn them of loss of protection by the 
canister or to indicate leaks. [1,137] However, phosgene has poor warning 
properties in low concentrations [1,90] and therefore the odor cannot be
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depended upon to indicate a faulty gas mask in time to prevent harm to the 
wearer.
Training in the use of respiratory protection is required by 29 CFR 
1910.134 and is stressed as an essential work practice in occupations 
involving potential exposure to phosgene. [1,138] Accordingly, a 
requirement for training is included in the standard. Recognition of the 
odor of phosgene should be a part of this training. [138]
Gas-mask canisters should be replaced immediately after each use, 
when the seal is broken, when any leakage is detected, when high breathing 
resistance develops, or when the recommended shelf life expires, whichever 
occurs first. [137]
Because of the irritant properties of phosgene, emergency respiratory 
protection must provide both eye and respiratory protection for the worker. 
Full-face masks are the only acceptable devices for employees exposed to 
phosgene leaks or for the protection of personnel who may be exposed to 
sudden high concentrations of phosgene. Masks connected to air lines or 
having a self-contained air or oxygen supply can also be used. Pocket- or 
mouthpiece-type respirators used for escape in some operations [137] are 
not recommended for that purpose.
Eye Protection
Liquid phosgene is probably a severe eye irritant, [11,139] as 
discussed in Chapter V. Protection should be provided against accidental 
splashes of the liquid. [90,108] Vapor concentrations of phosgene which 
are said to affect the eyes (1-10 ppm) are likely to affect the respiratory 
system as well. Accordingly, eye and respiratory protection should be 
combined by use of full-face respiratory protection.
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Skin Protection
Liquid phosgene is said to cause severe skin burns, [1,90,139] and 
although this point is inadequately documented, it is a likely effect as 
discussed in Chapter V. Skin exposure to liquid phosgene should be 
prevented by the use of impervious clothing and gloves. Clothing 
impregnated with phosgene should be removed immediately.
Leak Detection
Continuous monitoring of areas where phosgene exposure can occur is 
considered essential and should be required when suitable models are 
available. Such monitors should be attached to alarm systems which will 
indicate dangerous levels of phosgene. For monitoring purposes phosgene- 
indicating crayons have been used. [1,10,140] Phosgene detector tubes have 
been described, [1,2,90] as have test papers, [2,10,90] and commercially 
available automatic monitor-alarms. [90, RJ Zellner, written 
communication, November 1974] Holding a bottle of strong ammonia water 
near a phosgene leak will produce a visible white cloud. [1,2,10,133] 
However, this should not be done unless the worker is wearing a respirator.
Leak Control
When detected, leaks should be repaired immediately by personnel 
wearing the proper protective clothing and respiratory protection. Leak 
repair kits may be assembled [1] or are commercially available. [133] 
Routine inspection should be scheduled to check pumps, lines, and 
containers for leaks; this practice is especially important during 
maintenance operations.[36] Leaking containers should be positioned so that
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gas rather than liquid phosgene is discharged from the leak. [133] This 
results in less discharge of phosgene and the escaping gas cools the 
remaining phosgene, thus reducing pressure and leakage. Introducing 
moisture into phosgene can cause increased pressures sufficient to rupture 
containers [10,11] or can cause leaks through corrosion. [10,11]
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VII. RESEARCH NEEDS
Long-term epidemiologic studies of worker populations exposed at or 
below the recommended environmental limits are needed. Such studies should 
consider not only the pulmonary effects but also the possible carcinogenic 
effect of phosgene. As a minimum, these studies should include 
environmental air measurements, medical histories, pulmonary function 
studies, histories of known or suspected acute exposures to phosgene, and 
comparisons with morbidity and mortality information for the general 
population.
Animal studies should be conducted to document pulmonary or other 
changes resulting from exposure at low levels of phosgene for extended 
periods. These studies should also address the issues of carcinogenicity, 
mutagenicity, and teratogenicity.
A sampling and analytical method for personal monitoring capable of 
detecting 0.05 ppm or less of phosgene should be developed. The accuracy, 
sensitivity, and applicability of the method to field situations should be 
demonstrated by a program of field and laboratory testing.
Existing methods for automatic, continuous monitoring should be 
tested for sensitivity, accuracy, and specificity by comparison with a 
reliable standard method. Since one of the primary functions of automatic, 
continuous monitoring is as a warning device, alarm systems should be 
developed and tested for reliability.
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IX. APPENDIX I 
AIR SAMPLING PRACTICES FOR PHOSGENE
General Requirements
i r
Air concentrations shall be determined within the worker's breathing 
zone and shall meet the following criteria in order to evaluate conformance 
with the standard:
(a) Samples collected shall be representative of the individual 
worker's exposure.
(b) Sample data sheets shall include:
(1) The date and time of sample collection.
(2) Sampling duration.
(3) Volumetric flowrate of sampling.
(4) A description of the sampling location.
(5) Sampling temperature and pressure.
(6) Other pertinent information.
Breathing Zone Sampling
(a) To ensure that a sample is representative of a worker's
exposure, collection shall be as near the worker's breathing zone as 
practical. Sampling should not hamper the typical movement patterns
associated with his work.
(b) A portable, battery-operated, personal sampling pump, and a 
midget impinger containing 10-20 ml of a solution of 0.25% 4—(A'— 
nitrobenzyl)pyridine and 0.5% N-phenylbenzylamine in diethylphthalate are 
used to collect the sample.
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(c) The sampling rate shall be 0.5-1.0 liter/minute and samples 
shall be taken for a time period appropriate to the estimated concentration 
of phosgene in the air (eg, at the recommended environmental limit, 0.1 ppm
phosgene in air, a flowrate of 1 liter/minute, and a sample time of 25
minutes, 10 jug of phosgene can be collected in 10 ml of sampling reagent.)
(d) A series of short-term samples shall be taken for each TWA.
The number of TWA's shall be in compliance with Table 1-2 for each 
operation.
The TWA may be determined as follows:
TWA = Cltl + C2t2 + ...+ Cntn
T
where C = phosgene concentration during any period of time t 
T = tl + t2 +...+ tn
Sampling times should be selected so that the calculated TWA is
representative of the full 8-10 hour workshift.
Calibration of Sampling Trains
Since the accuracy of an analysis can be no greater than the accuracy 
of the volume of air which is measured, the accurate calibration of a 
sampling pump is essential to the correct interpretation of the pump's 
indicated flow rate. The frequency of calibration should be dependent on 
the use, care, and handling to which the pump is subjected. In addition, 
the pump should be recalibrated if it has been subjected to misuse, or if 
it has just been repaired or received from a manufacturer. If it receives 
hard usage, more frequent calibration may be necessary.
106
Ordinarily, pumps should be calibrated in the laboratory both before 
they are used in the field and after they have been used to collect a large 
number of field samples. The accuracy of calibration is dependent on the 
type of ainstrument used as a reference. The choice of calibration 
instrument will depend largely upon where the calibration is to be 
performed. For laboratory testing, primary standards, such as a spirometer 
or soapbubble meter, are recommended although other standard calibrating 
instruments, such as a wet-test meter, or dry-gas meter, can be used. The 
actual setups will be similar for all instruments.
Instructions for calibration with the soapbubble meter follow. If 
another calibration device is selected, equivalent procedures should be 
used. The calibration setup for personal sampling pumps with a midget
impinger is shown in Figure XIII-1.
(a) Check the voltage of the pump battery with a voltmeter to
assure adequate voltage for calibration. Charge the battery if necessary.
(b) Assemble the midget impinger with the appropriate solution.
(c) Assemble the sampling train as shown in Figure XIII-1. If a 
prescrubber is used to remove interferents, the sampling train should be 
assembled with the prescrubber in line with the midget impinger.
(d) Turn the pump on and moisten the inside of the soapbubble
meter by immersing the buret in the soap solution and drawing bubbles up 
the inside until they are able to travel the entire buret length without 
bursting.
(e) Adjust the pump rotameter to provide a flowrate of 1
liter/minute.
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(f) Check the water manometer to ensure that the pressure drop 
across the sampling train does not exceed 13 inches of water (approximately 
1 inch of mercury).
(g) Start a soapbubble up the buret and, with a stopwatch, measure 
the time it takes the bubble to move from one calibration mark to another. 
For a 1000-ml buret, a convenient calibration volume is 500 ml.
(h) Repeat the procedure in (g) above at least twice, average the 
results, and calculate the flowrate by dividing the volume between the 
preselected marks by the time required for the soapbubble to traverse the 
distance.
(i) Data for the calibration includes the volume measured, elapsed 
time, pressure drop, air temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, 
serial number of the pump, date, and name of the person performing the 
calibration.
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X. APPENDIX II 
ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PHOSGENE
Principle of the Method
(a) A known volume of air is drawn through a solution of 0.25% 4-
(4'-nitrobenzyl)pyridine and 0.5% N-phenylbenzylamine in diethylphthalate 
contained in a midget impinger. Phosgene present reacts with the solution 
to produce a brilliant red color.
(b) The absorbance of the sample solution is determined at 475 nm
using a colorimeter or spectrophotometer.
(c) Comparison of sample absorbance with a standard curve allows 
quantitation of phosgene present.
Range and Sensitivity
(a) The lower limit of detection is 5 jug phosgene in the sample.
(b) The upper limit of the method may be varied, according to
sample requirements, by appropriate adjustment of the usual sampling 
parameters (ie, sample time, solution volume, and flow rate).
(c) The 95% confidence limits for 10 degrees of freedom are ±0.007
mg at the 0.017-mg level, and ±0.003 mg at the 0.10-mg level. The 
precision was determined by repeated analyses by the same technician. 
Rather than air sampling in the field, the precision was determined by 




Other acid chlorides, alkyl and aryl derivatives which are sub­
stituted by active halogen atoms and sulfate esters will produce color with 
this reagent. However, most of these interferents can be removed in a pre­
scrubber containing 1,l,2-trichloro-l,2,2-trifluoroethane if necessary. 
[104] The method is not subject to interference from carbon tetrachloride, 
chloroform, perchloroethylene, trichloroethylene, dichlorodifluoromethane, 
chlorine, hydrogen chloride, or chlorine dioxide. [85,104]
Color Stability
The red color formed is stable for at least 4 hours and should be 
measured within 9 hours; a color density loss of 10-15% can be expected 
after 8 hours. A slight decrease in color density may be expected if 
sampling is performed during high humidity (eg, 11% decrease at 73% 
relative humidity). [104]
Efficiency
Sampling efficiency is 99% or better. Evaporation losses are 
negligible. [85,104]
Advantages of the Method
(a) High collection efficiency.
(b) High specificity for phosgene in most likely sample environ­
ments.
(c) No elaborate equipment needed.
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(d) Minimal technical expertise required for sampling and analysis.
(e) Relative ease of personal sampling.
Disadvantages of the Method
(a) Potential spillage of liquid sampling solution.
(b) Potential breakage of glass sampling equipment.
(c) Sample color instability on standing.
(d) Color density decreased by high relative humidity.
Apparatus
(a) Sampling
(1) Portable, battery-operated, personal sampling pump.
(2) Midget impinger.
(3) Flexible plastic tubing as appropriate.
(b) Analysis
(1) Glassware as required for reagent measurement.
(2) Colorimetric spectrophotometer capable of absorbance
measurements at 475 nm.
(3) Spectrophotometer cells (cuvettes).
(c) Calibration
(1) Pressurized cylinder of phosgene gas.
(2) Pressure regulator.
(3) Flow meter.
(4) Appurtenant equipment for gas dilution methods or 
a midget impinger.
(5) Gas drying tubes.
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Reagents
All reagents are ACS Reagent Grade.
(a) 4-(4'-nitrobenzyl) pyridine/N-phenyl benzylamine absorbing
solution: Dissolve 0.25 g 4-(4'-nitrobenzyl)pyridine and 0.5 g N-
phenylbenzylamine (may also be called N-benzylaniline) in 100 ml 
diethylphthalate. Store in an amber bottle.
(b) Gas purifying reagent: Approximately 50% anhydrous sodium
iodide and 50% sodium thiosulfate, by weight.
(c) Diethylphthalate.
Standards
Method A: Use commercially available compressed phosgene gas (99.0%)
to bubble known amounts of the gas through a midget bubbler containing the 
absorbing solution. Measure with a spectrophotometer (475 nm) the color 
developed to establish a standard curve. It has been recommended [141] 
that the phosgene be passed through a drying tube filled with a mixture of 
anhydrous sodium iodide/sodium thiosulfate prior to bubbling.
Method B: Pass the compressed phosgene gas through a tube containing
anhydrous sodium iodide/sodium thiosulfate and into a glass bubbler 
containing diethylphthalate solution with excess normal alcoholic sodium 
hydroxide solution. Analyze for chloride by any of the standard 
titrametric methods. [142,143] Use demineralized water for this analysis. 
Dilute aliquots of phosgene-containing diethylphthalate with additional 
diethylphthalate to prepare a series of samples of known concentration 
(based on chloride analyses). To each sample add an equal volume of
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double-strength absorbing solution (0,5% 4-(4'-nitrobenzyl) pyridine and 
1.0% N-phenylbenzlamine in diethylphthalate). Mix and measure the 
absorbance (475 nm) after 5 minutes.
Analysis
Transfer an aliquot of the phosgene-containing absorbing solution to 
a spectrophotometer cuvette and measure the absorbance at 475 nm against a 
blank of the pure reagent. Determine the phosgene concentration from a 
calibration curve suitable for the specific volume of reagent used and the 
volume of air sampled.
Standard Curve Preparation
Using linear graph paper, plot absorbance readings on the ordinate 
(vertical axis) and phosgene concentration on the abscissa (horizontal 
axis). Standard phosgene concentrations are prepared by Method A or Method 
B above.
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XI. APPENDIX III 
PHOSGENE MONITORS
Whenever phosgene may be released or created as a result of leaks, 
accidents, etc, in quantities sufficient to produce exposures above the 
recommended ceiling concentration limit, it is essential that phosgene 
monitoring devices be installed, and that these devices give immediate 
warning of concentrations likely to be hazardous to life or health. It is 
difficult to define the limiting circumstances when such devices may be 
required, but if reasonable doubt exists, the decision should be made by a 
professional industrial hygienist. Monitoring devices may be based upon 
several operating principles, and at least one is currently (1976) 
commercially available. No matter what device is used, certain criteria 
common to phosgene monitors should be considered before purchasing any 
instrument.
Summary of Specifications
(a) The monitoring device must sound an alarm or otherwise warn
employees whenever a phosgene concentration of 0.2 ppm is reached or 
exceeded.
(b) The monitoring device must have a response time of 90 seconds
or less when exposed to phosgene at a concentration of 0.2 ppm.
(c) Zero drift should be less than 1% of full scale reading in 24 
hours. That portion of the signal manifested as background noise should be 
less than plus or minus 1% of full scale reading.
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(d) The monitoring device must be accurate to within plus or minus
10% of the reading for the range of 0.05-0.4 ppm phosgene.
(e) Precision and repeatability must be plus or minus 5% of full 
scale reading.
(f) It is desirable that the instrument respond only to phosgene,
but devices which respond to other gases not normally present in the 
atmosphere may be acceptable. Whenever there is a possibility that gases 
or vapors, such as hydrogen chloride, chlorine, benzoyl chloride, acetyl 
chloride, and oxalyl chloride, may be present, it would be desirable to 
determine in advance the response of the instrument to such gases or 
vapors.
(g) An operating range of 0-0.4 ppm phosgene is recommended, but
other ranges may be selected to suit individual needs.
(h) The device should be capable of 168 hours of continuous,
unattended operation.
(i) The device and alarm should be intrinsically safe for use in
locations where explosion hazards may occur.
Discussion
The principal requirements for such monitors in addition to 
responding to phosgene gas are that they be sufficiently rugged to 
withstand pressure, vibration, normal extremes of temperature, etc, and not 
be susceptible to plugging or interferences due to contaminants likely to 
be encountered in most workplaces. They should be so constructed that it 
is possible to routinely and quickly check the zero setting of the 
instrument and the response to phosgene at 0.2 ppm. T.t is permissible to
115
perform such checks by electrical means, but at least once each month 
instruments should be checked with a known concentration of 0.2 ppm 
phosgene in air.
Pressurized cylinders containing phosgene in nitrogen are 
commercially available. According to the National Bureau of Standards, 
[144] phosgene concentrations in cylinders are stable up to at least 3 
months if the nitrogen originally put in the cylinder was very dry. In 
order to avoid the problems of degradation of the phosgene in the cylinder, 
it is recommended that phosgene at concentrations of 50-100 ppm in nitrogen
be obtained and then diluted to the selected check concentration, ie, 0.2
ppm, as needed. This new concentration should be verified by the
analytical procedure in Appendix II. Permeation tubes can also be used for 
generation of phosgene at known concentrations, but this requires a 
temperature-controlled manifold. A single calibration point at 0.2 ppm can 
be checked to determine whether the instrument has maintained its 
calibration. If the reading differs by more than 0.02 ppm from the
previous calibration, then several other calibration points over the useful 
range of the instrument should be checked and a new calibration 
established. If the monitor is off by more than 0.02 ppm, the other 
variables should be checked, eg, flow rate, electronics, detection media.
In large plants, where there are considerable distances between work 
stations, additional monitors may be required to ensure worker safety. 
Alternately, a multipoint sampling system bringing sampled air to a single 
instrument may be satisfactory.
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XII. APPENDIX IV 
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
The following items of information which are applicable to a specific 
product or material shall be provided in the appropriate block of the 
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS).
The product designation is inserted in the block in the upper left 
corner of the first page to facilitate filing and retrieval. Print in 
upper case letters as large as possible. It should be printed to read 
upright with the sheet turned sideways. The product designation is that 
name or code designation which appears on the label, or by which the 
product is sold or known by employees. The relative numerical hazard 
ratings and key statements are those determined by the rules in Chapter V, 
Part B, of the NIOSH publication, An Identification System for 
Occupationally Hazardous Materials. The company identification may be 
printed in the upper right comer if desired.
(a) Section I. Product Identification
The manufacturer's name, address, and regular and emergency telephone 
numbers (including area code) are inserted in the appropriate blocks of 
this section. The company listed should be a source of detailed backup 
information on the hazards of the material(s) covered by the MSDS. The 
listing of suppliers or wholesale distributors is discouraged. The trade 
name should be the product designation or common name associated with the 
material. The synonyms are those commonly used for the product, especially 
formal chemical nomenclature. Every known chemical designation or 
competitor's trade name need not be listed.
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(b) Section II. Hazardous Ingredients
The "materials" listed in this section shall be those substances
which are part of the hazardous product covered by the MSDS and
individually meet any of the criteria defining a hazardous material. Thus,
one component of a multicomponent product might be listed because of its 
toxicity, another component because of its flammability, while a third 
component could be included both for its toxicity and its reactivity. Note 
that a MSDS for a single component product must have the name of the 
material repeated in this section to avoid giving the impression that there 
are no hazardous ingredients.
Chemical substances should be listed according to their complete name 
derived from a recognized system of nomenclature. Avoid using common names 
and general class names such as "aromatic amine," "safety solvent," or 
"aliphatic hydrocarbon" when the specific name is known.
The "%" may be the approximate percentage by weight or volume 
(indicate basis) which each hazardous ingredient of the mixture bears to 
the whole mixture. This may be indicated as a range or maximum amount, 
(ie, "10-40% vol" or "10% max wt") to avoid disclosure of trade secrets.
Toxic hazard data shall be stated in terms of concentration, mode of 
exposure or test, and animal used, ie, "100 ppm LC50-rat," "25 mg/kg LD50- 
skin-rabbit," "75 ppm LC man," or "permissible exposure from 29 CFR 
1910.1000," or, if not available, from other sources of publications such 
as the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists or the 
American National Standards Institute Inc. Flammable or reactive data 
could be flash point, shock sensitivity, or other brief data indicating 
nature of the hazard.
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(c) Section III. Physical Data
The data in this section should be for the total mixture and should 
include the boiling point and melting point in degrees Fahrenheit (Celsius 
in parentheses); vapor pressure, in conventional millimeters of mercury
(mmHg); vapor density of gas or vapor (air = 1); solubility in water, in
parts/hundred parts of water by weight; specific gravity (water = 1);
percent volatiles (indicated if by weight or volume) at 70 degrees 
Fahrenheit (21.1 degrees Celsius); evaporation rate for liquids or 
sublimable solids, relative to butyl acetate; and appearance and odor. 
These data are useful for the control of toxic substances. Boiling point, 
vapor density, percent volatiles, vapor pressure, and evaporation are 
useful for designing proper ventilation equipment. This information is 
also useful for design and deployment of adequate fire and spill 
containment equipment. The appearance and odor may facilitate
identification of substances stored in improperly marked containers, or 
when spilled.
(d) Section IV. Fire and Explosion Data
This section should contain complete fire and explosion data for the 
product, including flash point and autoignition temperature in degrees 
Fahrenheit (Celsius in parentheses); flammable limits, in percent by volume 
in air; suitable extinguishing media or materials; special firefighting 
procedures; and unusual fire and explosion hazard information. If the 
product presents no fire hazard, insert "NO FIRE HAZARD" on the line 
labeled-"Extinguishing Media."
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(e) Section V. Health Hazard Information
The "Health Hazard Data" should be a combined estimate of the hazard 
of the total product. This can be expressed as a TWA, as a permissible 
exposure, or by some other indication of an acceptable standard. Other 
data are acceptable, such as lowest LD 50, if multiple components are 
involved.
Under "Routes of Exposure," comments in each category should reflect
the potential hazard from absorption by the route in question. Comments
should indicate the severity of the effect and the basis for the statement
if possible. The basis might be animal studies, analogy with similar 
products, or human experiences. Comments such as "yes" or "possible" are 
not helpful.
"Emergency and First Aid Procedures" should be written in lay 
language and should primarily represent first aid treatment that could be 
provided by paramedical personnel or individuals trained in first aid.
Information in the "Notes to Physician" section should include any 
special medical information which would be of assistance to an attending 
physician including required or recommended preplacement and periodic 
medical examinations, diagnostic procedures, and medical management of 
overexposed workers.
(f) Section VI. Reactivity Data
The comments in this section relate to safe storage and handling of 
hazardous, unstable substances. It is particularly important to highlight 
instability or incompatibility to common substances or circumstances such 
as water, direct sunlight, steel or copper piping, acids, alkalies, etc. 
"Hazardous Decomposition Products" shall include those products released
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under fire conditions. It must also include dangerous products produced by 
aging, such as peroxides in the case of some ethers. Where applicable, 
shelf life should also be indicated.
(g) Section VII. Spill or Leak Procedures
Detailed procedures for cleanup and disposal should be listed with 
emphasis on precautions to be taken to protect workers assigned to cleanup 
detail. Specific neutralizing chemicals or procedures should be described 
in detail. Disposal methods should be explicit including proper labeling 
of containers holding residues and ultimate disposal methods such as 
"sanitary landfill," or "incineration." Warnings such as "comply with 
local, state, and federal antipollution ordinances" are proper but not 
sufficient. Specific procedures shall be identified.
(h) Section VIII. Special Protection Information
This section requires specific information. Statements such as
"Yes," "No," or "If necessary" are not informative. Ventilation
requirements should be specific as to type and preferred methods. 
Respirators shall be specified as to type and joint NIOSH and US Bureau of 
Mines approval class, ie, "Supplied air," "Organic vapor canister,"
"Suitable for dusts not more toxic than lead," etc. Protective equipment 
must be specified as to type and materials of construction.
(i) Section IX. Special Precautions
"Precautionary Statements" shall consist of the label statements 
selected for use on the container or placard. Additional information on
any aspect of safety or health not covered in other sections should be
inserted in this section. The lower block can contain references to 
published guides or in-house procedures for handling and storage.
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Department of Transportation markings and classifications and other 
freight, handling, or storage requirements and environmental controls can 
be noted.
(j) Signature and Filing
Finally, the name and address of the responsible person who completed 
the MSDS and the date of completion are entered. This will facilitate 
correction of errors and identify a source of additional information.
The MSDS shall be filed in a location readily accessible to workers 
potentially exposed to the hazardous material. The MSDS can be used as a 
training aid and basis for discussion during safety meetings and training 
of new employees. It should assist management by directing attention to 
the need for specific control engineering, work practices, and protective 
measures to ensure safe handling and use of the material. It will aid the 
safety and health staff in planning a safe and healthful work environment 
and suggesting appropriate emergency procedures and sources of help in the 
event of harmful exposure of employees.
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
1 PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
M A N U F A C T U R E R 'S  N A M E
R E G U L A R  TELEPHO NE NO. 
E M E R G E N C Y  T ELEPH O NE  NO.




M A T E R IA L  O R  COMPONENT % H A Z A R D  DATA
III PHYSICAL DATA
BO IL IN G  POINT, 760 M M  HG M E LT IN G  POINT
SPEC IF IC  G R A V IT Y  |H20  = 1I VAPOR PRESSURE
VAPOR DENS ITY  (AIR=1> SO LU B IL IT Y  IN H20, % BY WT.
% VOL AT ILES BY VOL. EVAPO RA T IO N  RATE  (BUTYL A C E T A T E 111
APPEARANCE  A N D  ODOR
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V HEALTH HAZARD INFORMATION
HEALTH HAZARD DATA






EFFECTS OF OVEREXPOSURE 
ACUTE OVEREXPOSURE
CHRONIC OVEREXPOSURE









CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTING TO INSTABILITY
INCOMPA1 iBILITY
HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS
CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTING TO HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION
VII SPILL OR LEAK PROCEDURES
STEPS TO BE TAKEN IF MATERIAL IS RELEASED OR SPILLED 
NEUTRALIZING CHEMICALS
WASTE OISPOSAL METHOD
VIII SPECIAL PROTECTION INFORMATION
VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS
SPECIFIC PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
RESPIRATORY (SPECIFY IN DETAIL)
EYE
GLOVES
OTHER CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT
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IX SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS
PR EC A U T IO N A R Y
STA TEM EN TS
O TH ER  H A N D L IN G  A N D  
STO RA G E  R EQ U IR E M E N T S




XIII. TABLES AND FIGURE
TABLE XIII-1 
CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF PHOSGENE
Carbonyl chloride, carbon oxychloride,Synonyms
Chemical formula 
Formula weight 
Boiling point (1 atm)
Freezing point (1 atm)
Density, liquid, 0 C 
Density, gas, 20 C
Specific gravity, gas, 20 C (air = 1) 
Specific gravity, liquid, 19 C/4 C 
Expansion ratio, liquid to gas, 














Slightly soluble in water, 
hydrolyzes to hydrochloric acid and 
carbon dioxide. Soluble in carbon 
tetrachloride, chloroform, acetic 
acid, benzene, toluene 
Colorless
Sweet in low concentrations; sharp, 













Organic chemical synthesizers 
Phosgene workers 
Resin makers
Welders or brazers (near chlorinated 
solvent vapors)
Adapted from Gafafer [15]
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FIGURE XIII-1
C A L IBR A T IO N  SETU P  FOR P E R S O N A L  S A M P L IN G  
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